The Impact of Contract Enforcement Costs on Outsourcing and Aggregate Productivity by Boehm, Johannes
The Impact of Contract Enforcement Costs on
Outsourcing and Aggregate Productivity
Johannes Boehm∗
Sciences Po
This draft: October 28, 2015
Abstract
Legal institutions affect economic outcomes, but how much? This paper documents
how costly supplier contract enforcement shapes firm boundaries, and quantifies the im-
pact of this transaction cost on aggregate productivity and welfare. I embed a con-
tracting game between a buyer and a supplier in a general-equilibrium closed-economy
Eaton-Kortum-type model. Contract enforcement costs lead suppliers to underproduce.
Thus, firms will perform more of the production process in-house instead of outsourcing
it. On a macroeconomic scale, in countries with slow and costly courts, firms should buy
relatively less inputs from sectors whose products are more specific to the buyer-seller
relationship. I first present reduced-form evidence for this hypothesis using cross-country
regressions. I use microdata on case law from the United States to construct a new mea-
sure of relationship-specificity by sector-pairs. This allows me to control for productivity
differences across countries and sectors and to identify the effect of contracting frictions
on industry structure. I then proceed to structurally estimate the key parameters of my
macro-model. Using a set of counterfactual experiments, I investigate the role of con-
tracting frictions in shaping productivity and income per capita across countries. Setting
enforcement costs to US levels would increase real income by an average of 7.5 percent
across all countries, and by an average of 15.3 percent across low-income countries. Hence,
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gregate level of development.
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1 Introduction
Countries differ vastly in the speed and cost of formal contract enforcement procedures: while
Icelandic courts often resolve commercial disputes within a few months, cases in India that
are decades old are commonplace.1 A large and prominent literature has argued that these
institutional frictions constitute transaction costs between firms, which in turn affect their ver-
tical integration decision (Williamson, 1985), and potentially even the pattern of development
(North, 1990). The logic goes as follows: if enforcement of supplier contracts is costly or im-
possible, firms will perform a larger part of the production process within the firm, instead of
outsourcing it, thereby avoiding having to contract with an external supplier. This increases the
cost of production.2 Higher production cost then feeds into higher input prices in downstream
sectors, thus amplifying the distortions on the macroeconomic scale.3
This paper studies the quantitative importance of contract enforcement costs for aggregate
outcomes using recently developed tools from quantitative trade theory, together with data on
enforcement costs and intermediate input expenditure shares across countries. I make three
contributions to our understanding of the role of institutions for economic outcomes. First,
building on the seminal work of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Antra`s (2003), I construct a
tractable general-equilibrium model that reveals how contract enforcement costs, together with
asset specificity, shape the firm’s domestic outsourcing decision and the economy’s industry
structure. To describe contracting frictions, I extend the literature on hold-up in a bilateral
buyer-seller relationship to a setting of enforceable contracts, where enforcement is subject to
a cost and goods are relationship-specific. Contracts may alleviate hold-up problems only if
enforcement costs are sufficiently low. Second, I find evidence for my model’s qualitative predic-
tions on external input use using cross-country reduced-form regressions. Using microdata on
case law from the United States I construct a new measure of dependence on formal enforcement
institutions, which arises in the model because of relationship-specific investment. By counting
the number of court cases between two sectors, and normalizing it, I obtain the relative preva-
lence of litigation between these two sectors, which, for given enforcement costs, is informative
about the extent to which firms rely on formal enforcement. The fact that this is a bilateral
measure means that I can control for cross-country heterogeneity in the upstream sectors, and
identify the effect of costly enforcement on outsourcing. Third, I show that the presence of
contracting frictions in vertical relationships has large consequences for aggregate productiv-
1Council of Europe (2005), Supreme Court of India (2009)
2In a case study on the TV broadcasting industry in India, Anand and Khanna (2003) give the example of
the cable network firm Zee Telefilms Limited (ZTL), which was faced with a multitude of local cable operator
firms that grossly understated the number of subscribers and underpaid fees. Litigation was slow and costly,
thus ZTL was forced to expand into the cable operator’s business. The resulting distribution subsidiary was not
profitable for the first five years after its inception, a long time in an industry that consisted mostly of small
young firms.
3Nunn (2007) shows that institutional quality affects comparative advantage of a country through this
channel; see also the handbook chapter by Nunn and Trefler (2014). The idea of a ’multiplier effect’ goes
back to Hirschman (1958), with more recent applications to development patterns by Ciccone (2002) and Jones
(2011a, 2011b).
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ity and welfare. I do this by structurally estimating my model and simulating the aggregate
variables in the absence of enforcement costs. Hence, the effects of contracting frictions on
firm boundaries, such as those studied by organizational economists in general, and by Antra`s
(2003) and subsequent papers in the context of international trade, have large implications for
aggregate productivity and welfare.
The analysis proceeds in several steps. I first propose a general-equilibrium model where
firms face a binary decision between in-house production and domestic outsourcing for each task
in the production process. Firms and suppliers draw independent productivity realizations
for each task. In-house production uses labor, which is provided on a frictionless market.
Outsourcing, however, is subject to contracting frictions that increase its effective cost. To
understand what drives the magnitude of the distortion I explicitly model the interaction of
the buyer and seller. The produced goods are relationship-specific, i.e. they are worth more
within the buyer-seller relationship than to an outside party. Contracts specify a quantity to
be delivered and a fee, and are enforceable at a cost which is proportional to the value of
the claim.4 Courts do not enforce penal clauses in the contract, and award damages only to
compensate the innocent party. This places strong limitations on the ability to punish the
underperforming party, and may give rise to the seller breaching the contract in equilibrium.
When the buyer holds up the seller, the seller could recover his fee net of damages by going to
court. In the presence of enforcement costs, the amount the seller could recover is lower, leading
him to ex-ante produce less than the efficient quantity. On the other hand, if enforcement costs
are high and the resulting inefficiency is large, it may be preferable to write an unenforceable
(informal, incomplete) contract, where the inefficiency depends on the degree of relationship-
specificity (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1979). This can be replicated through an enforceable
contract where the specified quantity is zero.5 Thus, the overall distortion when using an
optimal contract is the minimum of the distortions implied by enforcement costs (in the case of
a formal contract, and breach) and relationship-specificity (in the case of an informal contract).
Hence, the possibility of formal enforcement will improve outcomes when enforcement costs are
low compared to the distortions under an informal contract.
Next, I provide empirical evidence for my model’s key qualitative prediction using cross-
country reduced-form regressions. The model predicts that in countries where enforcement
costs are high, firms spend less on inputs where (absent formal enforcement) distortions from
hold-up problems would be very severe. I thus regress intermediate input expenditure shares by
country and sector-pair on an interaction of country-wide enforcement costs and a sector-pair-
level measure of dependence on formal enforcement institutions. I construct this measure of
enforcement-intensity from data on case law from the United States for 1990-2012. Litigation
can only be observed when firms write enforceable contracts to get around the hold-up problem,
hence the prevalence of litigation is informative about the extent to which firms rely on formal
4Enforcement costs include time costs, court fees, and fees for legal representation and expert witnesses.
5The model thus provides a new economic rationale for preferring informal contracts over formal ones, where
the threat of litigation and its associated costs may lead the seller to ex-ante underinvest.
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enforcement institutions. My sector-pair-specific enforcement-intensity index is therefore the
number of court cases with a firm from the upstream sector, per firm in the downstream
sector. On the sector-pair-country level this measure, interacted with enforcement costs in the
country, is negatively correlated with the downstream sector’s expenditure share on inputs from
the upstream sector: in countries with high enforcement costs, intermediate input shares are
lower for sector-pairs where litigation is common in the United States. Since this enforcement-
intensity measure varies across sector-pairs, I can include country-upstream sector fixed effects
and thus control for unobserved heterogeneity, such as differences in productivity and access to
external financing, across sectors and countries. To the extent of my knowledge, my paper is
the first to use this identification strategy in cross-country regressions. 6
Finally, I quantify the impact of enforcement costs on aggregate variables by structurally
estimating the key parameters of my model and performing a set of counterfactual exercises.
This is possible because my model exploits the tractability of multi-country Ricardian trade
models, most notably the one of Eaton and Kortum (2002), even though these papers study
an entirely different question. I obtain a relatively simple expression for intermediate input use
between sectors, where contracting frictions distort input prices and lower intermediate input
expenditure shares in the same way iceberg trade costs lower trade shares in the Eaton-Kortum
model. I structurally estimate the key elasticities, along with country-specific parameters such
as sectoral productivity levels, from data on intermediate input shares and enforcement costs.
This allows me to perform welfare counterfactuals, and highlight the macroeconomic significance
of transaction costs: reducing enforcement costs to zero would increase real income per capita
by an average of 19.6 percent across all countries, and decrease consumer prices by an average
of 11.9 percent. For many countries the welfare impact exceeds the gains from international
trade that the literature has estimated. Since zero enforcement costs may be impossible to
achieve in practice, I also calculate the counterfactual welfare gains when enforcement costs
are set to US levels. The corresponding increase in real income would still be on average 7.5
percent across all countries, and on average 15.3 percent across low-income countries.
The paper contributes to the literature on legal institutions and their macroeconomic ef-
fects.7 The challenges in this literature are twofold. First, it is hard to empirically identify
the effect of institutions on macro-outcomes due to the presence of many unobserved factors
that correlate with institutions and development. The literature on cross-country regressions in
6My enforcement-intensity index is positively correlated with industry-level measures of relationship-
specificity (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007, Bernard et al. 2010). These measures, however, are constructed
using data on input-output relationships, which are endogenous in my analysis, and/or are only available for
physical goods. Furthermore, they only vary across sectors, whereas my enforcement intensity variable is at the
sector-pair level, allowing me to identify the institutional channel from cross-country heterogeneity in sectoral
productivity.
7For example, theoretical work by Acemoglu, Antra`s and Helpman (2007) studies the effects of contracting
frictions on the incentives to invest in technology. The empirical literature often employs reduced-form cross-
country regressions, see Rajan and Zingales (1998), La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2003), Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005), and many others. Recent country-specific work include Laeven and Woodruff (2007) and
Chemin (2010) on judicial efficiency in Mexico and, respectively, India; Ponticelli (2015) on bankruptcy reform
in Brazil, and Cole, Greenwood, and Sanchez (2012) on courts and technology adoption in Mexico.
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macroeconomics typically deals with this by trying to proxy for these unobserved factors. This
introduces measurement error and other problems. By exploiting variation across countries
and sector-pairs, I can include country-upstream-sector fixed effects and thus control for unob-
served heterogeneity in country-industry pairs in a much cleaner way. Second, the importance
of enforcement institutions is hard to quantify. I therefore guide my empirical analysis using
a micro-founded model. The empirical counterpart for the enforcement cost maps exactly into
the theoretical concept.
The paper is also related to the literature on the role of intermediate inputs for aggregate
outcomes.8 These papers typically take the country’s input-output structure as exogenous, or
even take the US input-output table to describe the industry structure across countries. I show
that input-output tables differ substantially and systematically across countries and exploit
this variation in my empirical analysis. In the model I endogenize the sectoral composition of
the firm’s input baskets.
My paper draws heavily from the literature on contracting frictions and the sourcing decision
in international trade;9 however, it departs from it in two substantial ways that allow me to
quantify the effect of contracting frictions. Firstly, by assuming that enforcement is costly
and that courts only protect expectation interest (both of which can be observed in reality,
and measured), I am able to move away from a world of stark contrasts, where contracts
are either perfectly enforceable or not enforceable at all. The resulting setting nests both
extreme cases, but also allows for intermediate situations in which enforcement institutions
play a quantiative, not only qualitative, role.10 Secondly, I choose to study only domestic
buyer-seller relations. This has the advantage that I know the relevant jurisdiction (namely,
the courts in that country), but mean that I potentially misestimate the true distortions coming
from poor formal enforcement. This concern, however, is mitigated by two considerations. Much
of the distortions are on the use of services inputs, which are particularly prone to hold-ups
because the cost of investment is immediately sunk, but are typically performed within country
borders. Moreover, any distortion to international trade due to contracting frictions cannot
8Among others, Hirschman (1958), Romer (1980), and Jones (2011a, 2011b) for economic growth, Acemoglu
et al. (2012) and Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) for fluctuations. Oberfield (2013) provides a firm-level theory
for how input linkages shape aggregate productivity. Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2014) document the cross-
country dispersion in intermediate input shares, but do not study its determinants.
9My paper builds on the literature on the property rights approach to international firm boundaries (see
Antra`s (2015) for a summary) and the literature on institutions and international trade, as surveyed in the
Handbook chapter by Nunn and Trefler (2014). Khandelwal and Topalova (2011) show that increased access
to intermediate inputs increases firm productivity. Nunn (2007) uses cross-country regressions to show that
contracting institutions shape comparative advantage and explains this using a story similar to mine. Compared
to his work, I show direct evidence on input use and study the quantitative effects of contracting institutions.
To keep my model sufficiently tractable to allow estimation of the parameters, I draw from the literature on
quantitative trade models, see Eaton and Kortum (2002), Chor (2010), Costinot, Donaldson, and Komunjer
(2012), Caliendo and Parro (2015), and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012). Recently, Eaton,
Kortum, and Kramarz (2015) provide a firm-level theory of international vertical linkages and the division of
labor. Recent micro-level evidence comes from Alfaro et al. (2015a, 2015b).
10cf. North (1990): “A good deal of literature on transaction costs takes enforcement as a given, assuming
either that it is perfect or that it is constantly imperfect. In fact, enforcement is seldom either, and the structure
of enforcement mechanisms and the frequency and severity of imperfection play a major role in the costs of
transacting and in the forms that contracts take.”
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cause a welfare loss greater than the overall gains from trade, which suggests that (at least for
relatively large countries) my estimates cover the bulk of the relevant distortions.11
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a macromodel of input choice, where
contracting frictions distort the firm’s make-or-buy decision. Section 3 qualitatively assesses
the model’s key prediction using cross-country reduced-form regressions. Section 4 structurally
estimates the model of section 2, and evaluates the productivity and welfare implications of
costly contract enforcement. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Macroeconomic Model of Input Sourcing
This section presents a macroeconomic model where firms face the decision between producing
in-house and outsourcing. The model economy is closed. Outsourcing is subject to frictions
due to the presence of contract enforcement costs. These frictions distort the relative price
of outsourcing, and thus lead to over-use of in-house production. I first discuss the firm’s
production functions, and then turn to the modes of sourcing. I pay particular attention
to the contracting game that is played in the case of outsourcing, explaining how and when
enforcement costs matter, and derive an expression for the magnitude of price distortions.
Finally, I put the model into general equilibrium by adding households, and derive predictions
for aggregate input use.
Methodologically, the model exploits the tractability of the Eaton and Kortum (2002) ap-
proach to modeling discrete sourcing decisions, albeit for a very different purpose. I model the
firm’s binary decision to outsource in the same way as Eaton and Kortum model the decision
which country to buy from. The contracting frictions in my model, for which I provide a mi-
crofoundation, enter the expression for intermediate input shares in the same way that iceberg
trade costs enter the expression for trade shares in Eaton-Kortum. This allows me to model
both frictions and input-output linkages between sectors in a tractable way, and it simplifies
the structural estimation and evaluation of the welfare implications.
2.1 Technology
There are N sectors in the economy, each consisting of a mass of perfectly competitive and
homogeneous firms. Sector n firms convert inputs {(qni(j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N into output yn
11Indeed, Irarrazabal et al. (2013) argue that exporting and multinational production are close substitutes.
Garetto (2013) estimates that the gains from intra-firm international trade are roughly 0.23 percent of consump-
tion per capita. For more complex sourcing strategies, see Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013). Fally and
Hillberry (2015) offer a related model, but focus on the tradeoff between intra-firm coordination costs versus
inter-firm transaction costs instead of the institutional dimension.
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according to the production function12
yn =
N∏
i=1
(∫ 1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1γni
, n = 1, . . . , N. (2.1)
where
∑
i γni = 1 for all n = 1, . . . , N . The sets {(n, i, j), j ∈ [0, 1]}i=1,...,N are the sets of inputs
that sector n may source from a firm belonging to sector i, or, alternatively, produce itself using
labor. The index j denotes the individual activities/varieties within each basket. As an exam-
ple, consider a car manufacturing plant. Then, n = car and i ∈ {metal, electricity, R&D, . . . }
are the different broad sets of activities, corresponding to the different upstream (roughly
2-digit) sectors, that need to be performed during the production process. The index j cor-
responds to the individual varieties of inputs (in the case of physical inputs) or tasks (in the
case of intangible inputs) in each basket (n, i). The firm faces the outsourcing decision for
every (n, i, j): a manufacturing plant may want to contract with an accounting firm to do the
accounting for them, or decide to employ an accountant themselves, perhaps at a higher cost.
In this case, the activity j would be ’accounting’, and the upstream industry i would be the
business services sector. The technological parameters γni captures the weight of the broad set
of inputs i in the production process of sector n: γcars,steel will be high, whereas γcars,agriculture
will be low.
For each activity (n, i, j), the sector n firms have to decide whether to produce the activity
themselves, or to outsource it. I model the boundaries of firms to be determined primarily by
their capabilities.13 Both the downstream firm and the potential suppliers draw an activity-
specific productivity realization, which determine the cost of each option. The downstream
firm decides on whether to outsource by comparing them. Outsourcing, however, is subject to
contracting frictions, which increase its cost and thus lead to too much in-house production
compared to a frictionless world. In order to keep the firm’s decision problem tractable, I
model outsourcing as buying activity (n, i, j) from a sector i firm via an intermediary. Once
the decision has been taken, it is irreversible.14 I discuss each of the two options in turn.
2.1.1 In-house Production
The sector n firm can produce activity (n, i, j) itself by employing labor. One unit of labor
generates sni(j) units of activity (n, i, j), thus the production function is qni(j) = sni(j)l(n, i, j),
where l(n, i, j) is labor used and sni(j) is a stochastic productivity realization that follows a
Fre´chet distribution,
P (sni(j) < z) = e
−Snz−θ .
12This is a model where every sector buys from every other sector, but apart from parameters, they are all
ex-ante identical. In a bilateral trade between two sectors, I always denote the downstream (buying) sector by
n and the upstream (selling) sector by i.
13This can be motivated by managers having a limited span of control (Lucas, 1978), or that there are
resources that cannot be transferred across firms (Wernerfelt, 1984).
14This eliminates competition between the potential employees and the suppliers. Bernard et al. (2003) relax
this assumption to obtain variable markups.
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I assume that the sni(j) are independent across i, j, and n. The parameter Sn captures the
overall productivity of in-house production by sector n firms: higher Sn will, on average, lead to
higher realizations of the productivity parameters sni(j). The parameter θ is inversely related
to the variance of the distribution. The labor market is perfectly competitive. Denote the wage
by w, and the cost of one unit of activity (n, i, j) conditional on in-house production by plni(j).
Then,
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
. (2.2)
2.1.2 Arm’s Length Transaction
In case of outsourcing, the sector n firms post their demand function to an intermediary. There
is one intermediary per activity. In turn, the intermediary sources the goods from a sector i
firm (’supplier’), who tailors the goods to the relationship. The intermediary then sells the
goods on to the downstream sector firm, earning revenue R(·), as given by the downstream
firm’s demand function. The interaction between supplier and intermediary is the one that is
subject to contracting frictions.
When dealing with the supplier, the intermediary chooses a contract that maximizes its
profit subject to participation by a supplier firm. The supplier’s outside option is zero. I will
show that the chosen contract pushes the supplier down to its outside option, which means
that this is also the contract that the social planner would choose if he wanted to maximize
the overall surplus (conditional on the frictions). One supplier is chosen at random, and the
intermediary and the supplier are locked into a bilateral relationship.
Suppliers can transform one unit of sector i output (produced using the production function
(2.1)) into zni(j) units of variety (n, i, j), thus the production function is qni(j) = zni(j)yi(n, i, j),
with yi(n, i, j) being the amount of sector i goods used as inputs.
15 Again I assume that zni(j)
follows a Fre´chet distribution,
P (zni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz−θ
and independent across i, j, and n. The average productivity realization is increasing in the pa-
rameter Ti, which captures the upstream sector’s overall capabilities (productivity, endowments,
etc.). The supplier’s cost of producing one unit of variety (n, i, j) is then cni(j) = pi/zni(j),
where pi is the price index of sector i’s output good, (2.1). The production of the variety is
partially reversible: by reverting, the supplier can get a fraction ωni ≤ 1 of its production cost
back by selling it on the Walrasian market for the sector i good. This is meant to capture the
degree of relationship-specificity of the variety: if ωni = 1, the variety is not tailored to the
relationship at all, whereas ωni = 0 means that the good is worthless outside the relationship.
All parameters, including the productivity realizations zni(j), are common knowledge. I drop
subscripts (n, i, j) for the remainder of the contracting game to simplify the notation.
15The assumption that variety (n, i, j) is produced using sector i goods in the case of outsourcing means that
the model exhibits input-output linkages across sectors. Ultimately, the whole production process is done using
labor and a constant returns to scale production technology; the distinction between labor and intermediate
inputs simply draws the firm boundaries and allows for better comparison with the data.
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Figure 1: Timeline of the contracting game
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6
Supplier
produces q units,
delivers
min(q, q∗)
Intermediary
either pays fee
M(q) or holds
up the supplier
Nash
bargaining to
settle contract
Nash
bargaining over
any excess
production
Intermediary sells
the goods to the
downstream
sector firm and
receives R(q)
Intermediary
and supplier
sign contract
(q∗,M(q))
The description of the contracting game proceeds as follows. I first describe the contracting
space, and discuss the timing of events and the enforcement mechanism. I then solve the
contracting game. Going back in time, I describe the problem of finding an optimal contract
and characterize the equilibrium thereunder. I then return to the implications for input prices
under arm’s length transaction.
The contract The contract between intermediary and supplier is a pair (q∗,M(·)), where
q∗ ≥ 0 is the quantity of the good to be delivered16, and M : [0, q∗]→ R\R− is a nonnegative,
increasing real-valued function that represents the stipulated payment to the supplier. M(q∗)
is the agreed fee. If M(q) < M(q∗) for q < q∗, this represents damage payments that are
agreed upon at the time of the formation of the contract, for enforcement in case of a breach of
contract (“liquidated damages”).17 I will explain the exact enforcement procedure after stating
the timing of events.
Timing of events
1. The intermediary and the supplier sign a contract (M(q), q∗) which maximizes the inter-
mediary’s payoff, subject to the supplier’s payoff being nonnegative. At this point the
intermediary cannot perfectly commit to paying M(q) once production has taken place,
other than through the enforcement mechanism explained below.
2. The supplier produces q units. He chooses q optimally to maximize his profits. I assume
that if q < q∗, he delivers all the produced units; if q ≥ q∗, he delivers q∗ and retains
control of the remaining units.18 A unit that has been delivered is under the control of
the intermediary.
16The supplier’s chosen quantity q may likewise be interpreted as quality of the product, or effort. The legal
literature calls this relationship-specific investment reliance (Hermalin et al., 2007).
17Most jurisdictions impose strong limits on punishment under these clauses. In English law, in terrorem
clauses in contracts are not enforced (Treitel, 1987, Chapter 20). German and French courts, following the
Roman tradition of literal enforcement of stipulationes poenae, generally recognize penal clauses in contracts,
but will, upon application, reduce the penalty to a ’reasonable’ amount (BGB § 343, resp. art. 1152 & 1231,
code civil, and Zimmermann, 1996, Chapter 4). Given my assumptions on the courts awarding expectation
damages (see below), any restrictions on M are not going to matter.
18Appendix B.1 considers an extension where the supplier decides about how much to deliver. The equilibrium
production (and therefore inefficiency) under an optimal contract remains the same as in the model from the
main text. See also Edlin and Reichelstein (1996).
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3. The intermediary decides whether or not to hold up the supplier by refusing to pay M(q).
4. If the contract has been breached (either because q < q∗ or because the intermediary did
not pay the fee M(q)), either party could enforce the contract in a court. The outcome of
enforcement is deterministic, and enforcement is costly. Hence, the two parties avoid this
ex-post efficiency loss by settling out of court. They split the surplus using the symmetric
Nash sharing rule, whereby each party receives the payoff under the outside option (i.e.
the payoff under enforcement), plus half of what would have been lost to them in the case
of enforcement (the enforcement costs). I explain the payoffs under enforcement below.
5. In case the supplier has retained control over some of the produced units, q − q∗, the
two parties may bargain over them. Again I assume that they split the surplus according
to the symmetric Nash sharing rule. Since there is no contract to govern the sale of
these goods, the outside option is given by the supplier’s option to revert the production
process.
6. The intermediary sells the goods on to the downstream firm, receiving revenue R(q).
Enforcement After the intermediary’s decision whether or not to hold up the supplier, either
party may feel that they have been harmed by the other party’s actions: the supplier may have
produced less than what was specified (q < q∗), and the intermediary may have withheld the
fee M(q). Either party may enforce the contract in the court. The court perfectly observes
all actions by both parties, and awards expectation damages as a remedy. The basic principle
to govern the measurement of these damages is that an injured party is entitled to be put “in
as good a position as one would have been in had the contract been performed” (Farnsworth
(2004), §12.8). The precise interpretation of this rule is as follows:
• If the supplier has breached the contract, q < q∗, he has to pay the intermediary the
difference between the intermediary’s payoff under fulfillment, R(q∗)−M(q∗), and under
breach, R(q)−M(q). Hence, he has to pay
D(q, q∗) = R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)) .
• In addition, if the intermediary has not paid the fee M(q), the court orders him to do so.
It is important to stress that the resulting net transfer may go in either direction, depending on
whether or not the parties are in breach, and on the relative magnitude of M(q) and D(q, q∗).
I assume furthermore that the plaintiff has to pay enforcement costs, which amount to a
fraction δ of the value of the claim to him. The value of the claim is the net transfer to him that
would arise under enforcement.19 These costs include court fees, fees for legal representation
19If the net transfer is negative, he would not have chosen to enforce in the first place. However, the other
party would then have had an incentive to enforce, and would have been the plaintiff. I show later that in
equilibrium the plaintiff is always the supplier.
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and expert witnesses, and the time cost. The assumption that enforcement costs are increasing
in the value of the claim is in line with empirical evidence (Lee and Willging, 2010), and also
strengthens the link between the model and the empirical analysis in Section 3: my data for
enforcement costs are given as a fraction of the value of the claim.20 In line with the situation in
the United States, I assume that enforcement costs cannot be recovered in court (Farnsworth,
2004, §12.8).21
Solving for the equilibrium of the contracting game I solve for a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium, which, for a given contract, consists of the supplier’s production choice qs
and the intermediary’s holdup decision, as a function of q. The holdup decision function gives
the intermediary’s optimal response to a produced quantity q, and the optimal production
choice qs is then the supplier’s optimal quantity q, taking the holdup decision function as given.
The full solution of the game is in Appendix A. Here, I discuss the intuition for the optimal
responses and the payoff functions.
Case 1: Seller breaches the contract. Consider first the case where the supplier decides
to breach, q < q∗. The intermediary refuses to pay M(q), in order to shift the burden of
enforcement (and thus the enforcement costs) on the supplier. Hence, in the case of enforcement,
the supplier would receive a net transfer of M(q)−D(q, q∗). This transfer is positive: if it was
negative, the supplier’s overall payoff would be negative and he would not have accepted the
contract in the first place. Thus, under enforcement, the supplier would be the plaintiff and
would have to pay the enforcement costs. To avoid the efficiency loss, the two parties bargain
over the surplus and settle outside of court. Under the symmetric Nash sharing rule each party
receives its outside option (the payoff under enforcement) plus one half of the quasi-rents (the
enforcement costs). Thus, the supplier’s overall payoff under breach is
pis (q,M, q
∗) = (1− δ) (M(q)−D(q, q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under enforcement
+
1
2
δ (M(q)−D(q, q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
(2.3)
if q < q∗. Since D(q, q∗) = R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)), the above simplifies to
pis (q,M, q
∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(q)−R(q∗) +M(q∗))− qcni(j) if q < q∗. (2.4)
Note that the intermediary’s revenue function R appears in the supplier’s payoff function. This
is due to the courts awarding expectation damages: the fact that damage payments are assessed
20Having the cost of enforcement in proportion to the value of the claim may also be seen as a desirable, to
align the incentives of the plaintiff’s attorney with those of the plaintiff. Following the report on civil litigation
costs in England and Wales by Lord Justice Jackson (Jackson, 2009b), the UK government passed reforms to
bring costs more in line with the value of the claims.
21Many countries have the enforcement costs paid by the losing party (’cost shifting’). See Jackson (2009a)
for a comparative analysis. While cost shifting may mean that in some circumstances punishment would be
possible and therefore higher quantities could be implemented, the resulting model does not allow for closed-form
solutions.
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to compensate the intermediary for forgone revenue means that the supplier internalizes the
payoff to the intermediary. The enforcement costs δ govern the supplier’s outside option, and
hence the settlement: higher enforcement costs means that the supplier can recover a smaller
fraction of his fee net of damages; therefore, the terms of the settlement are worse for him.
Note also that the contract (q∗,M) enters (2.4) only through q∗ and M(q∗), and only in an
additive manner. This is because the court awards damages such that the sum of liquidated
damages and expectation damages exactly compensates the intermediary. If enforcement costs
δ were zero, the expectations damages rule would ensure an outcome that is efficient within the
bilateral relationship.22
Case 2: Seller fulfills the contract. Consider next the case where the supplier fulfills
his part of the contract, q ≥ q∗. He delivers q∗ units to the intermediary, and keeps the
remaining units to himself. As in the case above, the intermediary refuses to pay the fee
M(q∗): subsequent enforcement of the contract would leave the seller with a payoff of only
(1− δ)M(q∗); hence, under the settlement with the symmetric Nash solution, the intermediary
only has to pay (1 − 1
2
δ)M(q∗). After the settlement of the contract, the two parties may
bargain over the remaining q − q∗ units. The Nash sharing rule leaves the supplier with its
outside option (what he would get by reversing the production process for the q − q∗ units)
plus one half of the quasi-rents. Thus, the supplier’s overall profits are
pis (q,M, q
∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contract payoff
+ωnicni(j) (q − q∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
payoff under reverting
+
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωnicni(j) (q − q∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
quasi-rents
− qcni(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
production cost
(2.5)
if q ≥ q∗. Hence, even in the case where the supplier fulfills his part of the contract, the contract
(q∗,M) only enters additively in the supplier’s payoff function. The terms of the bargaining
that governs the marginal return on production are now given by the degree of relationship-
specificity. A higher degree of relationship-specificity, captured by a lower ωni, worsens the
supplier’s outside option and hence lowers his payoff under the settlement.
Going back in time, the supplier chooses q to maximize his profits, given piecewise by (2.4)
and (2.5). The supplier’s profit function is continuous at q∗, and the shape of the ex-ante
specified payoff schedule M does not affect pis. This means that the intermediary is unable to
punish the supplier for producing less than the stipulated quantity, and q < q∗ may happen in
equilibrium.
Optimal Contract We now turn to the intermediary’s problem of finding an optimal con-
tract. He chooses a contract (M, q∗) that maximizes his payoff pib subject to participation by
22This point was first made by Shavell (1980), who argued that when courts assign expectation damages,
the parties may achieve first-best even if the contractually specified payoff is not state-contingent. Similarly, I
argue here that under expectation damages the state-contingent payoffs do not matter, and that the presence
of proportional enforcement costs then leads to efficiency loss.
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the supplier,
(M, q∗) = arg max
(Mˆ,qˆ∗)
pib
(
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗), Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
(2.6)
s.t. pis
(
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗), Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
≥ 0 (2.7)
where qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗) is the supplier’s profit-maximizing quantity,
qs(Mˆ, qˆ∗) = arg max
q≥0
pis(q, Mˆ , qˆ∗).
Since there is no ex-post efficiency loss, the intermediary’s payoff pib is the total surplus minus
the supplier’s payoff,
pib
(
q, Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
= R(q)− qcni(j)− pis
(
q, Mˆ , qˆ∗
)
.
In the solution to the contracting game above, we have shown that a contract (M, q∗)
enters the payoff functions in each case only in an additive manner. Therefore, by setting q∗
and M , the intermediary can only influence the supplier’s decision by shifting the threshold
for breach q∗. In choosing an optimal contract, the intermediary thus decides whether he
wants to implement the interior maximum in the case of breach by the seller (case 1), or the
interior maximum in case of fulfillment by the supplier (case 2). He will choose the case that
is associated with the smaller amount of distortions. The following proposition formalizes this
intuition, and characterizes the equilibrium under an optimal contract. It describes (1) the
produced quantity, (2) whether the equilibrium features a breach or a fulfillment by the seller,
and (3) the distribution of the rents between the two parties. Appendix A contains the proof.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under an optimal contract) An optimal contract (M, q∗) sat-
isfies the following properties:
1. The quantity implemented, qs(M, q
∗), satisfies
dR(q)
dq
∣∣∣∣
q=qs(M,q∗)
= min
(
2− ωni, 1
1− 1
2
δ
)
c (2.8)
2. qs(M, q
∗) < q∗ if and only if (1− 1
2
δ)−1 < 2− ωni.
3. The whole surplus from the relationship goes to the intermediary:
pis (qs(M, q
∗),M, q∗) = 0
To interpret this result, it is helpful to compare the equilibrium quantity qs(M, q
∗) to the
first-best quantity q˜, which is defined as the quantity that maximizes the overall surplus from
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the relationship,
q˜ ≡ arg max
q≥0
R(q)− qcni(j).
The first statement of Proposition 1 says that the equilibrium quantity produced under an
optimal contract, qs(M, q
∗), is lower than the first-best quantity q˜ (recall that R is concave,
and that 2−ωni > 1). The intuition for the efficiency loss depends on whether the equilibrium
features a breach or a fulfillment by the supplier. If the supplier breaches by producing q < q∗,
the presence of proportional enforcement costs mean that the supplier could only recover a
smaller fraction of his fee net of damages by going to court. Under the settlement he does not get
the full return on his effort, which causes him to ex-ante produce less than the efficient quantity.
Note that in the absence of enforcement costs (δ = 0), the supplier completely internalizes the
intermediary’s payoff through the expectation damages, and the resulting outcome would be
first-best. The magnitude of the efficiency loss in this case depends solely on the magnitude of
enforcement costs. In the case where the supplier fulfills his part of the contract, q ≥ q∗, the
degree of relationship-specificity governs the supplier’s outside option in the bargaining, and
thus the marginal return on production. A higher relationship-specificity (lower ωni) means
that the supplier’s outside option becomes worse, which results in a lower payoff under the
settlement. The supplier anticipates the lower ex-post return on production, and produces less
(Klein et al., 1979).
The second statement says that the optimal contract implements a breach by the seller if
and only if the cost of enforcement is low compared to the degree of relationship-specificity.
Given that it is impossible to implement the efficient quantity, the optimal contract implements
the case with the lower associated distortions (hence also the minimum function in expression
(2.8)). If the cost of enforcement is relatively low, the optimal contract implements a breach by
setting a high q∗: after the hold-up, the control over the produced units is with the intermediary,
and the supplier’s only asset is the enforceable contract whose value depends on the (relatively
low) enforcement costs. On the other hand, when the degree of relationship-specificity is low
and enforcement costs are high, the optimal contract will pick a low q∗ to allocate the residual
rights of control over the excess production q − q∗ with the supplier. In that case, his ex-post
return on production depends on his ability to reverse the production (i.e. the parameter ωni).
Hence, the optimal contract maximizes the surplus by maximizing the producer’s ex-post return
on production.23
The third statement says that the above is implementable while still allocating the whole
surplus from the relationship to the intermediary. This is not trivial, since the supplier’s payoff
schedule M is required to be nonnegative.
The reader may be concerned about the possibility of ’overproduction’ (q > q∗) arising
as an equilibrium outcome in the model despite there being little evidence on this actually
happening in practice. The right way to interpret such an equilibrium is as an outcome to an
23This is similar to the optimal allocation of property rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore,
1990).
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informal contract, where the option to enforce the claim in a court is either non-existent or
irrelevant. Indeed, a contract where M = 0 and q∗ = 0 would be equivalent to the situation
where enforceable contract are not available, as in the literature on incomplete contracts (Klein
et al., 1979, and others). The only reason why the optimal contract in this case features a
small but positive q∗ is because this allows the intermediary to obtain the full surplus from the
relationship. If I allowed for an ex-ante transfer from the supplier to the intermediary, setting
q∗ and M to zero would be an optimal contract in the case where the degree of relationship-
specificity is relatively low compared to enforcement costs.24
To summarize, the main benefit of having enforceable contracts is that when the stipulated
quantity q∗ is sufficiently high, the degree of relationship-specificity does not matter for the
resulting allocation and the ex-ante investment. The drawback is that the presence of enforce-
ment costs distorts the supplier’s decision. Hence, choosing a high q∗ will only be optimal if
the degree of relationship-specificity is sufficiently high, so that the efficiency loss associated
with a breach is lower than the efficiency loss associated with an unenforceable contract.
The model also yields a qualitative prediction on the occurrence of breach, which I will use
later to construct an empirical counterpart to the theoretical concept of relationship-specificity.
Corollary 2 (Relationship-specificity and breach) Let δ < 1 and the parties sign an op-
timal contract. Then, for sufficiently high degree of relationship-specificity (i.e. for a sufficiently
low ωni) the seller breaches the contract in equilibrium.
2.1.3 Returning to the Firm’s Outsourcing Decision
How does the contracting game fit into the macromodel? The intermediary’s profit-maximization
problem is exactly the problem of finding an optimal contract, (2.6) and (2.7), where the rev-
enue function R(q) is the product of the quantity q and the downstream sector firm’s inverse
demand function for activity (n, i, j). The produced quantity under the optimal contract is
then given by equation (2.8) in Proposition 1. The quantity distortion from the contracting
frictions induces a move along the downstream sector firm’s demand curve, and hence increases
the price to the downstream sector firm. We obtain the price of activity (n, i, j) under arm’s
length transaction by inserting the produced quantity into the inverse demand function:
pxni(j) =
µnpidni
zni(j)
where µn = σn/ (σn − 1) is the markup due to monopolistic competition, and
dni = min
(
2− ωni, 1
1− 1
2
δ
)
(2.9)
24The model thus makes a case for the possible desirability of informal contracts: if the degree of relationship-
specificity is low and enforcement costs are high, it is preferable to choose an informal contract rather than
specifying a high q∗ and have the supplier underperform due to the presence of high enforcement costs.
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is the resulting price distortion due to contracting frictions. The functional form of dni in terms
of the parameters ωni and δ is exactly the same as the distortion in equation (2.8).
Going back in time, the downstream sector firms decide on whether to produce in-house
or to outsource by comparing the price of the good under the two regimes, plni(j) and p
x
ni(j).
Given the perfect substitutability between the two options, the realized price of activity (n, i, j)
is
pni(j) = min
(
plni(j), p
x
ni(j)
)
(2.10)
2.2 Households’ Preferences and Endowments
There is a representative household with Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption of
goods from each sector,
U =
N∏
i=1
c
ηi
i , (2.11)
with
∑N
i=1 ηi = 1. Households have a fixed labor endowment L and receive labor income wL
and the profits of the intermediaries Π. Their budget constraint is
∑N
i=1 pici ≤ wL + Π, and
thus pici = ηi (wL+ Π).
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
I first describe prices and input use under cost minimization, and then define an equilibrium of
the macromodel and show existence and uniqueness. All proofs are in Appendix A.
To describe sectoral price levels and expenditure shares, some definitions are helpful. Let
Xni ≡
∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)1{j:pxni(j)<plni(j)}dj be the expenditure of sector n firms on activities that are
sourced from sector i, and Xn =
∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)dj the total expenditure (and gross output) of
sector n. We then have
Proposition 3 (Sectoral price levels and expenditure shares) Under cost minimization
by the downstream sector firms, the following statements hold:
1. The cost of producing one unit of raw output yn in sector n satisfies
pn =
N∏
i=1
(
αn
γni
(
Snw
−θ + Ti(µnpidni)
−θ)− 1θ)γni (2.12)
where w is the wage, and αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1−σn
θ
+ 1
)) 1
1−σn , with Γ(·) being the gamma function.
2. The input expenditure shares Xni/Xn satisfy
Xni
Xn
= γni
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ (2.13)
Furthermore, Xni/Xn is decreasing in dni.
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Proposition 3 gives expressions for the sectoral price levels and intermediate input expendi-
ture shares. The sectoral price levels solve the system of equations (2.12), and depend on the
cost of production under outsourcing and in-house production, and therefore on the produc-
tivity parameters Ti and Sn, as well as contracting frictions dni. The fact that suppliers may
themselves outsource part of their production process gives rise to input-output linkages be-
tween sectors; the sectoral price levels are thus a weighted harmonic mean of the price levels of
the other sectors. This amplifies the price distortions: an increase in the price of coal increases
the prices of steel and, through steel, machines, which in turn increases the cost of producing
steel further due to the steel industry’s dependence on machines.
The expenditure shares on intermediate inputs, equation (2.13), are then determined by the
relative effective cost of outsourcing versus in-house production. Higher effective cost of out-
sourcing will lead downstream firms to produce more activities in-house instead of outsourcing
them. Thus, the expenditure share of sector n on inputs from sector i is increasing in sector
i’s productivity, Ti, and the importance of sector i products for sector n, γni, and decreasing
in sector i’s input cost pi and contracting frictions dni.
Proposition 3 yields the key qualitative prediction of the model, namely that contracting
frictions, captured by dni > 1, negatively affect the downstream sector’s fraction of expenditure
on intermediate inputs from the upstream sector i. The elasticity θ determines the magnitude
of this effect.
On an algebraic level, equation (2.13) closely resembles a structural gravity equation in
international trade, with intermediate input expenditure shares replacing trade shares, and
contracting frictions dni replacing iceberg trade costs. This is the result of modeling the out-
sourcing decision in a similar way to Eaton and Kortum’s way of modeling the international
sourcing decision, and simplifies the quantitative evaluation of the model. In section 4 I use
equation (2.13) to estimate the key parameters, including θ, and use these estimates to study
the importance of costly contract enforcement for aggregate productivity and welfare.
I now proceed to closing the model. Intermediaries make profits due to the fact that they
have monopoly power for their variety. Aggregate profits are
Π =
∑
n
∑
i
Πni =
∑
n
∑
i
(
1− σn − 1
σn
1
dni
)
Xni. (2.14)
The markets for sectoral output clear
pici +
∑
n
(Xni − Πni) = Xi, i = 1, . . . , N. (2.15)
An equilibrium is then a vector of sectoral price functions (pn(w))n=1,...,N that satisfies (2.12).
Given the sectoral prices, all other endogenous variables can be directly calculated: intermediate
input shares (Xni/Xn)n,i from (2.13), and profits Π and gross output levels (Xn)n=1,...,N from the
linear system (2.14) and (2.15), where consumption levels are ci = ηi (wL+ Π) /pi. Regarding
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equilibrium existence and uniqueness, we obtain:
Proposition 4 Under constant returns to scale,
∑
i γni = 1 for all n, the equilibrium exists
and is unique.
The proof is straightforward: since ∂ log pn/∂ log pi = Xni/Xn, and ∃x < 1 such that
∑
iXni/Xn <
x for all n, the function defined by the right-hand side of (2.12) is a contraction mapping and
has a unique fixed point.
3 Reduced-form Empirical Evidence
In this section I present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model’s qualitative
predictions. To do that, I exploit cross-country variation in intermediate input expenditure
shares, enforcement costs, and variation across sector-pairs in the degree to which they rely on
formal enforcement. Having support for the model’s qualitative predications, I will then turn to
the quantitative importance of contracting frictions for outsourcing and welfare by structurally
estimating the model from Section 2.
To empirically operationalize the model, I here state a corollary to Proposition 3.
Corollary 5 For sufficiently high relationship-specificity 1− ωni, sector n’s expenditure share
on intermediary inputs from sector i is strictly decreasing in the enforcement costs δ.
The corollary directly follows from the fact that the expenditure share Xni/Xn is strictly de-
creasing in dni (Proposition 3), and that dni is strictly increasing in δ for sufficiently low ωni
(equation (2.9)). As explained in Section 2, when there is high relationship-specificity, the
supplier and intermediary write contracts such that the suppliers outside option in ex-post bar-
gaining is based on a threat to go to court, rather than a threat to revert production and sell it
elsewhere. In these cases, the better the courts work the smaller the inefficiency and the larger
the quantity supplied. This results in firms being more willing to outsource their production,
and hence a higher intermediate input expenditure share.
In this section I bring Corollary 5 to the data by estimating the following reduced-form
regression:
Xcni
Xcn
= αni + α
c
i + α
c
n + βδ
c(1− ωni) + εcni (3.1)
where Xcni is the total expenditure of sector n in country c on intermediate inputs from sector i,
both domestically and internationally sourced; Xcn is the gross output of industry n in country
c; δc is a country-level measure of enforcement cost; 1 − ωni is the dependence on formal
enforcement, such as what would arise when inputs are relationship-specific; αni are sector-pair
fixed effects; αci are upstream sector times country fixed effects, and α
c
n are downstream sector
times country fixed effects. In this equation, the expenditure share on intermediate inputs is a
function of an interaction of a sector-pair characteristic (relationship-specificity) with a country
characteristic (enforcement costs), as well as characteristics of the upstream and downstream
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sectors in the country, and sector-pair characteristics that are invariant across countries. A
negative value for β implies that a worsening of formal contract enforcement has particularly
adverse effects on outsourcing in sector pairs characterized by high relationship-specificity, as
predicted by Corollary 5. Equation (3.1) exploits variation in bilateral expenditure shares across
countries, controlling for factors that affect the expenditure shares on the upstream side (such
as sectoral productivity levels, skill and capital endowments, land and natural resources, but
also institutional and policy factors such as subsidies, access to external financing, and import
tariffs, or even measurement problems associated with particular inputs) and downstream side
(firm scale, taxes).
Equation (3.1) is similar to the functional form used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
subsequent papers, who explain country-sector-level variables using an interaction of a country-
specific variable with a sector-specific variable. This literature typically goes to great lengths
to try to control for the plethora of confounding factors that co-vary with the interaction term.
Still, some of these factors may be left unaccounted, or badly proxied, for. My specification
improves on this by exploiting variation across countries and bilateral sector pairs. This allows
me to include upstream sector-country level fixed effects, thereby controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity in the upstream sectors.
3.1 Data
Intermediate input expenditure shares I use cross-country data on intermediate input
expenditure from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, version 8 (Narayanan et
al., 2012). It contains input-output tables on 109 countries, from varying years ranging from the
beginning of the 1990’s to mid-2000. These tables typically originate from national statistical
sources, but have been harmonized by GTAP to make them comparable across countries. A
notable quality of this dataset is that it includes many developing countries, for which industry-
level data is typically scarce. The tables cover domestic and import expenditure for 56 sectors,
which I aggregate up to 35 sectors that roughly correspond to two-digit sectors in ISIC Revision
3. 25 Table 1 contains summary statistics on expenditure shares at the country level.
Enforcement cost The World Bank Doing Business project provides country-level informa-
tion on the monetary cost and time necessary to enforce a fictional supplier contract in a local
civil court. The contract is assumed to govern the sale of goods between a buyer and a seller
in the country’s largest business city. The value of the sale is 200% of the country’s income per
capita. The monetary cost is the total cost that the plaintiff (who is assumed to be the seller)
must advance to enforce the contract in a court, and is measured as a fraction of the value of
25There is a large related literature in industrial organization that measures the degree of vertical integration as
the fraction of value added in gross output (see Adleman, 1955, Levy, 1985, Holmes, 1999, and also Macchiavello,
2012). My measure is similar, but distinguishes between intermediate inputs from different sectors. Furthermore,
my data for intermediate input shares directly map into the theoretical counterpart in the model. I discuss
concerns regarding the observability of firm boundaries in section 3.3.
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the claim. It includes court fees, fees for expert witnesses, attorney fees, and any costs that
the seller must advance to enforce the judgment though a sale of the buyer’s assets. The time
until enforcement is measured from the point where the seller decides to initiate litigation, to
the point where the judgment is enforced, i.e. the payments are received. I construct a total
cost measure – again, as a fraction of the value of the claim – by adding the interest foregone
during the proceedings, assuming a three percent interest rate:26
δc = (monetary cost, in pct)c + 0.03 (time until enforcement, years)c .
I use the cost measures for the year 2005, or, depending on availability, the closest available
year to 2005. Whenever δc exceeds one, I set it equal to one. The resulting measure is weakly
negatively correlated with the economy’s overall intermediate input share (Figure 2).
While no measure of institutional quality is without drawbacks, there are two reasons why
this particular measure lends itself very well to my purposes: firstly, it has a quantitative
interpretation, and can be directly used as the parameter δ of the contracting game; secondly,
it is not based on observed litigation, and hence does not suffer from a potential bias due to
the use of informal contracts when enforcement costs are too high.
Dependence on Enforcement Recall that in the model, the more relationship-specific is the
good exchanged between the sectors, the more the parties rely on formal contract enforcement
to minimize distortions. In reality, relationship-specific investment may not be the only reason
for having to rely on court enforcement: the presence of repeated interaction and relational
contracts may allow trading partners to overcome hold-up problems without the involvement
of courts. Hence, if enforcement costs are the same across sectors, the prevalence of litigation
should be informative about the buyer and seller’s dependence on enforcement instutions: high
rates of litigation imply that the scope for hold-up is large (be it though high relationship-
specificity or the absence of relational contracts), and these are exactly the situations where
enforcement costs – and the quality of legal instutions in general – matter.27
I therefore construct a measure of “enforcement-intensity,” i.e. the frequency with which
firms from a particular sector-pair resolve conflicts in court, for one particular country where
26The expression is the proportional cost associated with a linear approximation of v(1−monetary cost,
pct)/(1+discount rate)(time, yrs), where v is a future payment. I obtain very similar results when using an eight
percent interest rate instead of three percent.
27Note that in my model the two parties do not actually go to court, but settle in order to avoid the enforcement
costs. This is a result of my contracting game being entirely deterministic: if the outcome of the enforcement
is known in advance, there is no point in actually going to court. It would be straightforward to extend the
game to a setting where, in some cases, the parties do actually end up in court; however, the resulting friction
would then be stochastic and it would be impossible to integrate the contracting into the general-equilibrium
macromodel. One simple way to get the prediction of more litigation for higher degree of relationship-specificity
would be to change the model by assuming that (1) parties cannot settle outside of court with an exogenous
probability, and (2) the possibility of an ex-ante transfer from the supplier to the intermediary, so that an
informal contract (q∗ = 0 and M = 0) is optimal in the case when relationship-specificity is low. Then, the
threat of litigation only occurs in the case of seller breach, and higher relationship-specificity is associated with
a higher prevalence of litigation.
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enforcement costs are low, so that enforcement costs themselves are not censoring the prevalence
of litigation in an asymmetric way across industries.28 In particular, using data for the United
States, for each pair of sectors I observe the number of court cases over a fixed period of time.
My data come from the LexisLibrary database provided by LexisNexis. It contains cases
from US federal and state courts. I take all cases between January 1990 and December 2012
that are related to contract law, ignoring appeal and higher courts, and match the plaintiff
and defendant’s names to the Orbis database of firms, provided by Bureau Van Dijk.29 Or-
bis contains the 4-digit SIC industry classification of firms; I thus know in which sectors the
plaintiffs and defendants are active in. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1996) documents that
in US state court cases related to the sale of goods or provision of services between two non-
individuals, the seller is more than seven times more likely to be the plaintiff. I thus assign
the plaintiff to the upstream industry. To obtain the likelihood of litigation between the two
sectors, I divide the observed number of cases by a proxy for the number of buyer-seller re-
lationships. If each downstream sector firm has exactly one supplier in each upstream sector,
the correct way to normalize is to use the number of firms in the downstream sector. This
yields a measure z
(1)
ni . Since the presence of more firms in the upstream sector may mean that
there are more buyer-seller relationships, I construct an alternative measure where I divide the
number of cases by the geometric mean of the number of firms active in the upstream and
downstream industries, yielding a measure z
(2)
ni .
30,31 I interpret these two measures as related
to the likelihood of litigation, and hence enforcement-intensity, for each pair of sectors. Table
2 shows summary statistics for z
(1)
ni and z
(2)
ni .
z
(1)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)
(# firms in sector n)
, z
(2)
ni =
(# cases between sectors i and n)√
(# firms in sector i) (# firms in sector n)
(3.2)
My measure is conceptually different from existing measures of relationship-specificity/enforcement-
intensity along three important dimensions.32 First, the existing measures are only available for
28It may seem at first glance that the prevalence of litigation across sectors in each country would be more
suitable to measure the dependence on legal institutions. The model (and plenty of anecdotal evidence),
however, suggest that the decision to use formal contracts in the first place depends on enforcement costs;
hence, country-specific litigiosity ratios would generally understate the true dependence on legal institutions
(and in an asymmetric way across sectors) and would lead to biased coefficient estimates. Of course, by
constructing enforcement-intensity indices for one country only, I assume that all non-institutional factors that
affect the dependence on court enforcement are constant across countries – an assumption that is implicitly
made in Rajan and Zingales (2007), Nunn (2007), and the vast majority of existing work on the topic. I will
argue below that even though this assumption may be violated, it is unlikely to drive the regression results.
29See Appendix D for details on the construction of matches and matching statistics.
30I use the number of firms in Orbis. The results are extremely similar when using the number of firms from
the Census Bureau’s Statistics on U.S. Businesses instead.
31Results are robust to using the number cases divided by the number of upstream sector firms as a measure
of enforcement-intensity.
32There are three existing measures of enforcement-intensity (sometimes directly interpreted as relationship-
specificity). Nunn (2007) uses the fraction of a sector’s inputs that are traded on an organized exchange,
Levchenko (2007) uses the Herfindahl index of input shares, and Bernard et al. (2010) measure contractability
as the weighted share of wholesalers in overall importers.
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physical goods, whereas my measures cover services sectors as well. Second, the existing mea-
sures depend on intermediate input share data or assume that input shares are constant across
countries. In section 3.2 I document that input shares vary sharply across countries, which ren-
ders the existing measures inapplicable to the study of cross-country input use patterns. Third,
and most relevant to my identification strategy, my measure varies across bilateral sector-pairs,
instead of being associated with the upstream sector. Given that the sectors in my dataset are
fairly broad, it is likely that the products being sold to one sector are quite different to the ones
sold to other sectors, and that the form of interaction varies with the trading partner. The
fact that my measure is sector-pair-specific is key to my identification strategy, as it allows me
to include upstream sector-country fixed effects to control for unobserved sector characteristics
like productivity.
Table 3 shows the ranking of upstream sectors by the average degree of enforcement-
intensity, as measured by z
(2)
ni (the ranking for z
(1)
ni is very similar). Services sectors are
on average more enforcement-intensive than manufacturing sectors, which are in turn more
enforcement-intensive than raw materials-producing sectors. A similar ranking is usually re-
garded to apply to the degree of relationship-specificity of inputs (Monteverde and Teece, 1982,
Masten 1984, Nunn, 2007). Once a service has been performed, it cannot be sold to a third
party, thus the scope for hold-up should be high. On the other end of the spectrum, raw ma-
terials have low depreciability and may be readily obtained through organized markets, thus
there is relatively little scope for hold-up. Hence, my measure is consistent with the view that
enforcement-intensity is (at least to some extent) stemming from the degree of relationship-
specificity of the input.
3.2 Cross-country Dispersion in Input-Output Tables
Table 4 shows the dispersion of intermediate input shares at the two-digit level from their
respective means. To obtain the numbers in the first part of the table, I first calculated the
standard deviation of the intermediate input shares for each sector-pair, and then took averages
of these standard deviations. The average dispersion of expenditure shares across all sector-pairs
is 2.3 percentage points. For services-producing upstream sectors, the dispersion is significantly
higher (at the 1% level) than for sectors that produce physical goods. Most striking, however, is
the fact that here is a sizeable number of sector-pairs for which the cross-country dispersion in
input expenditure shares is high. The second part of Table 4 shows that for roughly 5 percent
of sector pairs, the standard deviation is greater than 10 percentage points.
For which inputs is the cross-country dispersion in expenditure shares particularly large?
Figure 3 shows for every upstream sector the expenditure share on this sector, averaged across
downstream sectors. I use unweighted averages, to make sure the cross-country variation in
the resulting input shares is not due to a different sectoral composition. The left panel shows
that the dispersion is higher for inputs with higher average expenditure shares. Still, even
in log-deviations there is considerable heterogeneity across inputs. Among the inputs with
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high average expenditure shares, the (wholesale and retail) trade, business services, electricity,
transport, and financial services sectors show particularly high dispersion across countries. Note
that these sectors are also particularly enforcement-intensive, as shown by Table 3, whereas the
percentage-wise cross-country dispersion in input shares on the (not very contract-intensive)
oil and gas and petroleum and coal products sectors is relatively low. This suggests that
contracting frictions may play a role for external input use. In the following regressions I will
try to rule out alternative explanations.
3.3 Results
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (3.1) using ordinary least squares (standard
errors clustered at the country level in parentheses). The first two columns include only sector-
pair fixed effects, and do not correct for sectoral productivity differences across countries.
Nevertheless, the estimates of the interaction term’s coefficient, β, are negative. Columns
(3) and (4) correct for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the upstream sectors by
including fixed effect for each upstream sector-country pair. The estimates of the coefficient
increase in magnitude, suggesting that the specifications that exclude upstream sector-level
characteristics suffer from omitted variable bias. Both estimates are now significant at the .1%
level. In columns (5) and (6) I also include downstream sector-country fixed effects to control for
differences in the size of the downstream sectors across countries. The interaction coefficients
increase slightly as a result, and remain statistically significant. Overall, Table 6 shows that in
countries where enforcement costs are high, firms use less intermediate inputs in sector-pairs
where litigation is more prevalent in the United States. The estimates in columns (5) and
(6), my preferred specifications, imply that a one-standard deviation increase in each of the
interacted variables is associated with a decrease in the input share by .13 and .05 percentage
points, respectively. I will return to the quantitative effects of enforcement costs in more detail
in section 4, using my structural estimates.
In order to interpret the correlation shown in 6 as evidence in support of Corollary 5, we need
to discuss the extent to which we the dependent variables and explanatory variables capture
the corresponding theoretical counterpart in the model. One potential concern is that my
dependent variable, the expenditure share on intermediate inputs, does not correctly measure
outsourcing of production steps to another firm. Indeed, the unit of observation that underlies
the construction of an input-output table is the plant, meaning that intra-firm transactions
between plants belonging to different sectors also show up in the expenditure on intermediate
inputs.33 In order to resolve this concern, I repeat the above regressions using only sector-pairs
where the upstream sector is a services sector. Since services that are performed within the firm
boundaries are typically not priced and are thus not included in the firm-level questionnaires
that underlie the construction of input-output tables, the likelihood of the observed transactions
33That said, Atalay et al. (2003) show evidence that shipments of physical goods between vertically integrated
plants in the U.S. are very low – less than .1 percent of overall value for the median plant. Ramondo, Rappoport,
and Ruhl (2015) show that similar facts hold for international shipments between vertically integrated plants.
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being within the firm boundaries is much lower. The first two columns in Table 7 show that
the resulting point estimates are still statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
A second concern is that observed litigation may not accurately capture the dependence of an
industry-pair on formal enforcement, such as what would arise when products are specific to the
buyer-supplier relationship. If some product specifications are inherently hard to describe, or if
even courts in the United States do not possess the capabilities to understand and hence enforce
contracts, then the same will most likely apply to courts in other, including less developed,
countries. Hence, these factors would reduce external intermediate input use in all countries,
and will therefore be taken out by the sector-pair fixed effect.
The model does not capture the possibility that firms start to use relational contracts when
enforcement costs are prohibitively large. If this was a perfect substitute for formal enforcement
in courts, then coefficient on the interaction term should be zero. More generally, when firms
respond to high enforcement costs by finding ways that avoid the use of formal enforcement
institutions, the estimate of the coefficient on the interaction term in equation (3.1) should be
biased towards zero.
There is an extensive and growing literature that documents that social capital, particularly
trust, may help in overcoming frictions.34 Bloom et al. (2012) document that interpersonal trust
affects the internal organization of firms through decentralization. Thus, there is the possibility
that trust also affects the make-or-buy decision, which could mean that enforcement costs do
not accurately capture the magnitude of frictions between firms and potentially lead to biased
estimates. To address this concern, I include an interaction of a country-level trust measure
with enforcement-intensity. I follow the consensus in the literature by measuring trust as the
fraction of people that respond to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful when dealing with others?” with “Most
people can be trusted” as opposed to “Need to be very careful”. I use the numbers reported
by Algan and Cahuc (2013) in their Figure 1, which in turn are based on data from the World
Values Survey, European Values Survey, and Afrobarometer.
The estimates of the trust interaction’s coefficient come out as insignificant at the 5-percent
level, as reported in specifications (3) and (4) of Table 7. The coefficient on the enforcement
cost interaction remains negative and statistically significant. This suggests that while trust
may be a way to alleviate frictions in informal interpersonal relationships, they may not be a
substitute for enforcement of formal contracts between businesses in a court.
There is a concern that my measure of enforcement-intensity is capturing to some extent
the magnitude of intersectoral expenditure flows in the United States, perhaps because of the
lack of data for the number of buyer-seller relationships to normalize the number of court cases
(and the possibility that the proxies in (3.2) are unsatisfactory). I construct a dummy IUSni that
takes the value 1 if the intermediate input expenditure share in the US is above the median
US expenditure share, and 0 otherwise. In specifications (5) and (6) of Table 7, I include an
interaction of IUSni with enforcement costs, and with trust. The key explanatory variable, the
34See Algan and Cahuc (2013) for a survey of the relationship between trust and growth.
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interaction of enforcement cost with enforcement-intensity, remains statistically significant.35
Given that my dependent variable in the above regressions is the expenditure share on both
imported and domestically sourced intermediate inputs, it is natural to ask whether the lack
of distinction between the two modes of sourcing matters. Table 8 shows the results from
estimating equation (3.1) with the expenditure share of domestically sourced inputs in gross
output as the dependent variable. The point estimates of the interaction term’s coefficient
are slightly smaller than before, but remain statistically significant. Overall, I interpret the
correlation exhibited by Tables 6 to 8 as being in line with the model predictions.
4 Quantitative Evaluation of Enforcement Costs
In this section I return to my model from Section 2 and quantitatively evaluate the importance of
enforcement costs. I first build intuition for how changes in transaction costs affect the aggregate
variables by using the “exact hat algebra” developed by Dekle et al. (2008) and Arkolakis et al.
(2012). I then estimate the model parameters from its predictions for intermediate input use,
and simulate the welfare gains that would arise if countries reduced their enforcement costs.
4.1 The welfare gains from eliminating enforcement frictions
We now take a closer look at the welfare gains from reducing enforcement frictions. My measure
of welfare is real income per capita. Since households receive both labor income and the profits
of intermediaries, and the wage is the numeraire, we have
Y
PL
=
1 + Π/L
P
(4.1)
Welfare gains hence arise from a drop in the the consumer price level P and an increase in
profits per capita Π/L, as more tasks become outsourced. Taking the total differential of the
sectoral price levels pn in equation (2.12), and holding constant the T and S parameters, we
obtain
d log pn =
∑
i
Xni
Xn
(d log pi + d log dni) . (4.2)
Enforcement costs affect the sector’s price index both directly through the multiplicative dis-
tortion dni, and indirectly through the price level of its upstream sectors. The strength of
the input-output linkages is given by the expenditure shares Xni/Xn. Writing this in matrix
notation,
d log p = (I − Ξ)−1 diag
(
Ξ (d log dni)
′
n,i
)
(4.3)
where Ξ = (Xni/Xn)n,i denotes the matrix of expenditure shares. We see that the impact
of distortions on sectoral price levels is determined by the Leontief inverse (I − Ξ)−1, as in
35Results are very similar when including the US input-output expenditure shares interacted with enforcement
costs, instead of IUSni δ
c.
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standard sectoral models with input-output linkages. What is new, however, is that the ex-
penditure shares, and hence the Leontief inverse, are endogenously determined by the cost of
in-house production versus outsourcing. Hence, equations (4.2) and (4.3) are only first-order
approximations which hold exactly only for small changes in log dni. Note, in particular, that
the first-order effects do not depend on the elasticity θ; it matters only for the change in the
multiplier (i.e. the second-order effects).
4.2 Taking the model to the data
How do we take the model to a cross-country setting? I assume that the enforcement cost δ
may vary across countries, as well the sectoral productivity vectors T and S (which, similar to
the linear fixed effects in Section 3, capture not only physical productivity but also a host of
other factors that govern the cost of production). The technological parameters γni, and the
parameters that govern the dependence on enforcement, are taken as constant across countries.
I then take the model to the data by calibrating some of the parameters and estimating the
remaining ones. The World Bank’s measures of enforcement cost by country (as described in
Section 3.1) map directly into the model’s enforcement cost parameters δc: they give the cost
of enforcing a standardized supplier contract as a fraction of the value of the claim. It is worth
noting that this measure is not based on observed cases, and hence does not suffer from bias
due to firms substituting into informal contracts whenever such agreements are preferable.
Next, I calibrate the parameters governing the dependence on formal enforcement by sector
pair, ωni, using the litigation-intensity measures zni. The idea is that litigation can only be
observed when firms use formal contracts, which is more common when ωni is low, and this is
when enforcement costs matter for performance in the bilateral buyer-seller relationship.36 I
set
ωni = 1− 1
m
zni (4.4)
and estimate the parameter m. This strategy can also be motivated from theory: assume that
in each sector-pair, a small (measure zero) fraction of firms receive a shock that sets their
enforcement cost δc to be such that their distortion in the formal contract case, 1/(1 − 1
2
δc),
is uniformly distributed between 1 and 2. Then, the probability that these firms will use a
formal contract is 1 − ωni. Assuming furthermore that with probability m they cannot settle
in the ex-post Nash bargaining and initiate litigation, the probability of observing litigation is
m(1− ωni). Equation (4.4) sets this probability equal to the observed litigation ratio, zni.
Figure 4 shows the first-order approximation to the consumer price reductions from reducing
enforcement costs to US levels, as given by equation (4.3), as a function of the probability that
36More precisely, when we observe litigation, we know that firms rely on formal contracts, and hence enforce-
ment costs will matter for performance in their relationships. If we do not observe litigation, they may matter
(such as when firms decide use formal contracts and always decide to settle out of court), but also may not
matter (when they use informal contracts). Hence, by assuming that enforcement costs do not matter when we
do not observe litigation, my estimate for the importance of enforcement costs becomes a lower bound for the
true importance.
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firms cannot settle, m. A lower m means that the observed amount of cases indicates a higher
prevalence of formal contracting relationships, which is exactly when enforcement costs matter
more. Hence, a lower parameter m will lead to a larger implied first-order effect of enforcement
cost reduction.
Finally, I calibrate the within-basket elasticity of substitution σn to equal 3.5, which implies
markups of 40%, and the consumer’s Cobb-Douglass utility function parameters ηci to equal
the corresponding country-specific household expenditure shares, as measured by GTAP.
4.3 Estimation
I use the same dataset as in the reduced-form regressions of Section 3. My estimating equation
is the model’s expression for intermediate input expenditure shares, with an additive error term
with zero conditional mean,
Xcni
Xcn
= γni
T ci (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ
Scn + T
c
i (µnp
c
id
c
ni)
−θ + ε
c
ni (4.5)
where the parameter restrictions for constant returns to scale,
∑
i γni = 1 for all n, are imposed.
One can re-write this equation in a form that is similar to the well-known logit form,
Xcni
Xcn
= γni
1
1 + exp(αcn − αci + θ log dcni)
+ εcni (4.6)
where, in a slight abuse of notation, αcn = log(S
c
n/µ
−θ
n ) and α
c
i = log
(
T ci (p
c
i)
−θ). Note that this
mapping is invertible, so that conditionally on having calibrated µn through σn, the T
c
i and S
c
n
parameters are exactly identified.
The problem of choosing a suitable estimator for the parameters in (4.6) shares many
similarities with the choice of an estimator for gravity equations in international trade (see
Head and Mayer, 2014). The nonlinear least squares estimator would place much weight on
large observations and suffers from numerical problems due to nonconvexities. These difficulties
would be resolved when estimating the equation in logs. However, a NLS estimator on the log
of (4.6) would place much weight on the many intermediate input share observations that are
close to zero in levels, and deeply negative in the log. Instead, I use a Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML) estimator, which emerges as a compromise between placing weight on large
and small observations, while still being numerically feasible. The PPML has been widely used
to estimate gravity-type equations since being recommended by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006). Mathematically, the estimator is defined as
(
mˆ, θˆ, γˆ, Tˆ, Sˆ
)
= arg max
m,θ,γ,T,S
∑
n,i,c
(
Xcni
Xcn
log g (m, θ,γ,T,S)− g (m, θ,γ,T,S)
)
(4.7)
where g (m, θ,γ,T,S) = γni/(1 + exp(α
c
n − αci + θ log dcni)) and the maximization is subject to
the constraints
∑
i γni = 1 for every n = 1, . . . , N . The PPML is consistent if the conditional
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mean of the intermediate input shares is as described by the model equation. Numerically,
the estimator turns out to be friendly for the above functional form: for a given (m, θ), the
maximization converges to a unique solution, hence it is easy to find a global maximum by
searching over the (m, θ) space.
The two most interesting parameters are m and θ, because they govern, respectively, the
magnitude of the first-order and second-order welfare effects. Table 5 shows their estimates,
once using the preferred d
(1)
ni measure of contracting frictions, and once with the alternative
measure d
(2)
ni . The structural estimates of the elasticity of the input share, θ, are 2.81 and 3.06,
respectively, which is below the trade elasticities typically estimated using structural gravity
equations (Head and Mayer, 2014). The point estimates for both θ and m, which governs the
degree of the dependence on formal enforcement, are significant at the 1% level. This means that
the cross-country variation in intermediate input expenditure shares cannot be explained purely
through country- and sector-specific productivity parameters; instead the contracting frictions
term (dcni)
−θ has explanatory power as well, much like the interaction term has explanatory
power in the linear regressions in Section 3. The term (dcni)
−θ itself is parameterized through
m and θ, and the fact that m is estimated to be small means that the estimator attributes a
large portion of the variation in the input share to the contracting frictions term. Indeed, if
I set dcni to 1, the intermediate input shares would increase on average (across countries and
sector-pairs) by 21 percent (25 percent when estimating the model with ω
(2)
ni ).
I will regard the first specification, which uses d
(1)
ni , as the benchmark, and will limit my
discussion mostly to the the results coming from these estimates. The other specification yields
similar welfare implications.
4.4 Welfare Analysis
With the model estimated, we are now able to evaluate the importance of enforcement frictions.
In the first counterfactual, I take the estimated model, and set each country’s enforcement costs
to the level of the United States (17%), a level that is low in international comparison but still
possible to achieve for most countries through judicial reform. Table 9 shows the increase in
real income and decrease in the consumer’s price index that are associated with this change.
The first column lists the level of enforcement costs before the change. The second and third
column show the percentage change in real output per capita y and the consumer price level
P c as the enforcement costs are reduced. The average increase in real output per capita would
be 7.5%, and the average drop in the consumer price level would be 4.6%. Figure 5 summarizes
these welfare gains in a scatter plot, with counterfactual consumer price level changes (in (a),
real income per capita changes in (b)) on the vertical axis, and actual enforcement costs on the
horizontal axis. A fitted OLS regression line suggests that a reduction in enforcement costs by
one percentage point leads roughly to a 0.47% increase in real income and 0.23% drop in the
consumer price level. Since the estimate of θ is low, the first-order effects from reducing δ to
US levels, as described by equation (4.3), account for most of the total effect (93% on average
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across countries, and around 60% for the countries with the highest enforcement costs).
To assess the overall impact of bilateral contracting frictions, I also perform a counterfactual
where I completely abolish enforcement costs (columns four and five of Table 9). The average
increase in real per-capita income would be 19.6%, and the average decrease in the consumer’s
price level would be 11.9%. These numbers are large: when enforcement costs fall to very
low levels, even bilateral relationships that were formerly conducted using informal contracts
become formal and experience reductions in efficiency loss. Columns six and seven of Table 9
show that results are very similar when using the alternative measure for enforcement intensity,
z
(2)
ni . Table 10 shows the average welfare changes for different groups of countries. Enforcement
costs are particularly damaging in Africa and South-Eastern Asia. The key message from these
two exercises is theat enforcement frictions have implications for aggregate variables that are
relevant on a macroeconomic scale.
5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the importance of contracting frictions for the firm’s outsourcing de-
cision, and estimated the associated loss in aggregate productivity. The existing literature
typically models contracting frictions through incomplete contracts. However, there is little
evidence that judicial systems across countries differ in the degree of contractual incomplete-
ness. In this paper I have thus considered a dimension along which we know that countries
differ – the cost of contract enforcement. I have developed a rich yet tractable model to explain
how costly contract enforcement increases the effective cost of intermediate inputs, and how
this leads to too much in-house production. Using a novel measure of relationship-specificity
constructed from microdata on US case law, I have shown that in countries where enforcement
costs are high, firms tend to produce inputs that are very relationship-specific within the firm
boundaries. I have then estimated my model parameters and quantified the welfare loss from
costly enforcement.
What have we learned? First, contracting frictions distort the cost of sourcing intermediate
inputs, particularly those that are relationship-specific, leading to a reduction in the amount of
outsourcing. The welfare effects are large. Thus, I have shown that transaction costs and the
boundaries of the firm matter on a macroeconomic scale. The welfare effects exceed the gains
from trade for many countries. While the literature on contracting frictions in international
trade has shed much light on the role of contracting frictions in shaping input use, it is bound to
miss the bulk of the distortions for two reasons. First, any barriers to international trade (such
as contracting frictions) can only have welfare effects up to the gains of moving from autarky to
free trade. Therefore, the welfare effects of international contracting frictions must be second-
order. Second, contracting frictions are particularly important for relationship-specific goods,
in particular services. These are mostly traded within the economy boundaries.
A second, more general lesson is that economists should take great care when interpreting
input-output tables. Input-output tables differ systematically and significantly across countries.
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They differ systematically across countries in the sense that they are correlated with institutions
and patterns of dependence on formal enforcement, and significantly, because the fraction of the
variation that is explained by these frictions suggest that the welfare gains from removing them
are large. Hence, intermediate input expenditure shares are not mere ’technical coefficients’, but
are instead the endogenous outcome of firm’s outsourcing decisions. In particular, economists
should be cautious of using the United States’ input-output table to describe input use patterns
in other countries.
The third lesson is one for policy. My findings highlight the importance of judicial reform:
the welfare costs from costly contract enforcement are substantial, and must not be ignored. A
good rule of thumb to assess the magnitude of the welfare loss due to costly contract enforcement
is that every percentage point in the cost of enforcement decreases welfare by 0.47 percent.
Judicial reforms must weigh the benefits against the costs. They may be targeted to reduce
the costs of legal representation, such as in the case of the United Kingdom (Jackson, 2009b),
or attempt to clear the backlog of cases and speed up the litigation and enforcement process.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For the sake of ease of exposition, I will refer to the supplier as the ’seller’, and the intermediary
as the ’buyer’. A contract is a pair (q∗,M(q)) where q∗ ≥ 0 and M : [0, q∗] → R\R− is a
nonnegative increasing function. I call a contract C feasible if there is a quantity q ≥ 0 such that
the ex-ante profit from the relationship to the seller if he produces q, pis(C, q), is nonnegative.
Feasible contracts will be accepted by a potential supplier. Moreover, I call a quantity qˆ ≥ 0
implementable if there is a feasible contract C such that the seller decides to produce qˆ once he
has accepted the contract (i.e. qˆ = arg maxq pis(C, q)). Finally, a feasible contract C is optimal
if the payoff to the buyer under the seller’s optimal production choice is maximal in the class
of feasible contracts (i.e. Cˆ is optimal if Cˆ = arg maxC, C feasible pib(C, arg maxq pis(C, q))).
Suppose the buyer and seller have signed a feasible contract C. Our first step is to find the
payoff functions for the buyer and seller, pib and pis. Let q be the produced quantity. Distinguish
two cases:
1. The seller decides to breach the contract by producing less than the stipulated quantity:
q < q∗. The buyer will then hold up the seller by refusing to pay M(q). I will show later
that this is indeed optimal. If one of the two parties decides to go to court, the court
would (i) order the buyer to pay the agreed fee M(q) to the seller, (ii) order the seller to
pay damages to compensate the buyer for the loss that has arisen due to breach. Under
fulfillment of the contract, the buyer should receive the proceeds from selling q∗ to the
downstream firm, R(q∗), minus the fee paid to the seller, M(q∗). Thus, the amount of
damages are
D(q, q∗) ≡ R(q∗)−M(q∗)− (R(q)−M(q)) . (A.1)
The plaintiff also has to pay enforcement costs. In order to determine who the plaintiff
would be, we need to distinguish between two subcases.
(a) M(q) − D(q, q∗) > 0. In this case the fee that the seller would receive exceed the
damages that he would have to pay, thus the seller would have an incentive to go to
court. If he did that, he would receive the above amount minus enforcement costs,
which amount to a fraction δ of the value of the claim. Thus, under enforcement,
the supplier would get
(1− δ) (M(q)−D(q, q∗)) , (A.2)
whereas the intermediary would get the revenue from selling to the downstream firm,
net of fees M(q) and plus damage payments
R(q) +D(q, q∗)−M(q). (A.3)
From the definition of the damages (A.1) it is easy to see that the latter equals
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R(q∗) −M(q∗). Since enforcement entails a social loss of δ (M(q)−D(q, q∗)), the
buyer and seller will bargain over the surplus and settle out of court. (A.2) and (A.3)
are the seller’s and buyer’s outside options in the Nash bargaining. The symmetric
solution in the bargaining leaves each party with its outside option and one-half of
the quasi-rents (surplus minus the sum of outside options). Thus, the total payoffs
under breach are, respectively
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗))− cq if q < q∗ (A.4)
pib(q) = R(q)−
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗)) if q < q∗
Comparing pib here with the payoff in case the buyer did not hold up the seller,
R(q) −M(q), shows that it is preferable for the buyer to hold up. Note that since
the buyer already has control over the produced goods, the seller cannot revert the
production process.
(b) M(q) − D(q, q∗) < 0. In this case, the damages paid to the buyer exceed the fee
that he would have to pay to the seller. The buyer thus has an incentive to enforce
the contract in a court, and would have to pay the enforcement costs. Thus, under
enforcement, the seller’s payoff is
M(q)−D(q, q∗)
and the buyer’s payoff is
R(q) +D(q, q∗)−M(q)− δ (D(q, q∗)−M(q)) .
The two parties settle outside of court using the symmetric Nash sharing rule; each
receives its outside option (i.e. payoff under enforcement) plus one half of the quasi-
rents (enforcement costs). Thus, the seller’s ex-ante payoff is
pis (q) = M(q)−D(q, q∗) + 1
2
δ (D(q, q∗)−M(q))− cq
=
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(M(q)−D(q, q∗))− cq < 0
Since the ex-ante payoff of the seller is negative and we are only considering feasible
contracts (i.e. the seller’s payoff function is nonnegative for some q), this case will
never be chosen by the seller.
2. Fulfillment of the contract, q ≥ q∗. The supplier delivers q∗ units and holds back the
rest. The intermediary holds up the supplier by refusing to pay M(q∗) (again, comparing
this to the non-hold-up payoff shows that this is optimal). If the supplier goes to court
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to claim his payment, he would receive M(q∗) minus the enforcement costs δM(q∗). The
court awards no damages, since there has not been any loss in value.37 Since going
to court entails a welfare loss, the parties are going to settle outside of court using the
symmetric Nash sharing rule. Under the settlement the supplier receivesM(q∗)−δM(q∗)+
1
2
δM(q∗) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗), and the buyer receives R(q∗) − M(q∗) + 1
2
δM(q∗). Once
this is done, there may be excess production q − q∗ left, which is still more valuable
to the buyer than to the seller. Again, the two parties bargain over the surplus from
these goods, which is the additional revenue from selling the excess production to the
downstream firm, R(q) − R(q∗). Since there is no contract governing the sale of these
goods, the seller is left with the option to revert the production process if the bargaining
breaks down, in which case he gets ωc (q − q∗) (whereas the buyer gets nothing38). The
quasi-rents are the difference between the surplus and the sum of the outside options,
R(q)−R(q∗)−ωc (q − q∗). Under the Nash sharing rule, the supplier receives in addition
to his payoff from the settlement of the contract dispute
ωc (q − q∗) + 1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗)) = 1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗) + ωc (q − q∗))
which means that his overall ex-ante payoff is
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) +
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗) + ωc (q − q∗))− cq if q ≥ q∗ (A.5)
and the intermediary receives in the second settlement
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗))
which means his total ex-ante payoff is
pib(q) = R(q
∗)−
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗) +
1
2
(R(q)−R(q∗)− ωc (q − q∗)) if q ≥ q∗.
We have now characterized the payoff functions for seller and buyer, for a given contract.
Going back in time, the supplier chooses q optimally to maximize his ex-ante payoff pis. Let’s
first establish the fact that the supplier’s payoff function is continuous at q∗, which means that
it is impossible to punish him for breaching the contract.
Lemma 6 Let (q∗,M(q)) be a feasible contract. The supplier’s payoff function pis is continuous
at q∗.
37Cf. Farnsworth (2004), §12.10 in US law.
38These payoffs are in addition to the payoffs from the first bargaining (R(q∗)− 12δM(q∗) and (1− 12δ)M(q∗)
for the intermediary and supplier, respectively).
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Proof. The left-limit of pis at q
∗ only exists if q∗ > 0, in which case it is
lim
q↗q∗
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)− cq∗
and the right-limit of pis(q) at q
∗ is
lim
q↘q∗
pis(q) =
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
M(q∗)− cq∗
which is the same as the left-limit, thus pis is continuous at q
∗.
Let’s now look at the set of implementable quantities. The seller’s payoff maximization
problem is
max
q
pis(q) = max
(
max
q,q<q∗
pis(q), max
q,q≥q∗
pis(q)
)
. (A.6)
Denote the interior maxima of (A.4) and (A.5) by qδ and qω respectively. They satisfy the
first-order conditions
R′(qδ) =
1
1− 1
2
δ
c
R′(qω) = (2− ωi) c.
From (A.6) and the fact that both expressions pis(q) for q < q
∗ and q ≥ q∗ have unique maxima
at qδ and qω respectively, it is clear that the arg maxq pis(q) can only be either qδ, qω, or q
∗.
Because of the continuity of pis, q
∗ can only be implementable if either q∗ ≤ qδ or q∗ ≤ qω.39
Also, note that both qδ and qω do not depend on the contract (q
∗,M(q∗)) – though whether
they will be chosen by the supplier depends of course on the contract.
We now turn to the optimal contracting problem. In a world where the Coase Theorem
holds, the buyer would implement the efficient quantity q˜ = arg maxq R(q)−cq and appropriate
all the rents from the relationship. In the world of my model, since the implementable quantities
are all less or equal40 q˜, a contract that implements the largest implementable quantity (either
qδ or qω) and leaves the full surplus from the relationship with the buyer will be an optimal
contract. In the following I will construct such a contract. Distinguish two cases:
1. Case 1, 2 − ωi ≥ 1/(1 − 12δ), or, equivalently, qω ≤ qδ. In this case, choosing q∗ to be
greater than qδ and setting
M(q) = M(q∗) =
1
1− 1
2
δ
cqδ +R(q
∗)−R(qδ)
will implement qδ. The seller’s payoff under q = qδ is then zero, and the buyer receives
R(qδ)− cqδ.
39Suppose q∗ > qδ and q∗ > qω. Because of continuity of pis and the fact that R is concave, either pis(qδ) >
pis(q
∗) or pis(qω) > pis(q∗), thus q∗ is not implementable.
40Equal if and only if either ω = 1 or δ = 0.
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2. Case 2, 2− ωi < 1/(1− 12δ), or, equivalently, qω > qδ. The buyer wants to implement qω.
Set M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ such that
R(qω)− (2− ωi) qωc = R(q∗) + ωiq∗c. (A.7)
Such a q∗ exists because the RHS of this equation is zero for q∗ = 0 and goes to infinity
for q∗ → ∞, and is continuous in q∗, and the LHS is positive. Furthermore, it satisfies
q∗ < qω. Distinguish two subcases.
(a) q∗ ≥ qδ. Then the greatest profit that could be obtained by breaking the contract is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ) +M(q
∗)−R(q∗))− cqδ
=
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(qδ)−R(q∗))− cqδ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
(b) q∗ < qδ. Since pis(q) is increasing for all q < q∗, an upper bound for the profits that
could be obtained by breaking the contract is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(q∗) +M(q∗)−R(q∗))− cq∗ = −cq∗ < 0
thus q = qω is incentive-compatible.
Thus, setting M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ as in (A.7) implements qω with pis(qω) = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
1. We have
pni(j) = min
(
plni(j), p
x
ni(j)
)
and
plni(j) =
w
sni(j)
pxni(j) =
σn
σn − 1
pidni
zni(j)
.
From the fact that zni(j) follows a Frechet distribution,
P (zni(j) < z) = e
−Tiz−θ
we have that
P (plni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ)
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and analogous for sni(j),
P (pxni(j) > c) = exp
(
−Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
P (pni(j) < c) = 1− P (pni(j) > c) = 1− exp
(
−Sn
(w
c
)−θ
− Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
pidni
c
)−θ)
= 1− exp
(
−
(
Snw
−θ + Ti
(
σn
σn − 1pidni
)−θ)
cθ
)
= 1− e−Φnicθ
where
Φni =
(
Snw
−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
)
. (A.8)
and µn = σn/ (σn − 1). Denote
Qni =
(∫ 1
0
qni(j)
(σn−1)/σndj
) σn
σn−1
then
yn =
∏
i
Q
γni
ni
Derive the demand function for sector n firms,
min
Qni
∑
i
PniQni s.t. yn = 1
thus
PniQni = λγni (A.9)
From plugging this into the formula for yn,
pn ≡ λ =
N∏
i=1
(
Pni
γni
)γni
and similarly
Pni =
(∫
pni(j)
1−σn
)1/(1−σn)
.
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The latter becomes, using the distribution of pni(j) above,
Pni =
(∫ 1
0
pni(j)
1−σndj
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫ ∞
0
θp1−σn+θ−1ni Φnie
−Φnicθdc
)1/(1−σn)
=(∫ ∞
0
θ
(
Φnic
θ
)(θ−σn)/θ
Φ
σn/θ
ni e
−Φnicθdc
)1/(1−σn)
=
(∫ ∞
0
θt(θ−σn)/θΦσn/θni e
−tΦ−1ni θ
−1c1−θdt
)1/(1−σn)
(
Φ
(σn−1)/θ
ni
∫ ∞
0
t
1−σn
θ e−tdt
)1/(1−σn)
=
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
Φ
− 1
θ
ni
Thus the cost of one unit of yn is
pn =
N∏
i=1
(
αn
γni
Φ
− 1
θ
ni
)γni
where
αn ≡
(
Γ
(
1− σn + θ
θ
)) 1
1−σn
and Φni as defined above.
2. The probability that activity (n, i, j) is outsourced is
pini(j) ≡ P (pxni(j) ≤ plni(j)) =
∫ ∞
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
p
)−θ)
dFpx(p)
=
∫ ∞
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θpθ−1 exp
(−Φnipθ) dp
= Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ 1
Φni
∫ ∞
0
θpθ−1Φni exp
(−Φnipθ) dp
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Φni
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
and because of a LLN, it is also the fraction of type-i varieties that sector n sources from
sector i. The distribution of cost pni(j) conditional on activity (n, i, j) being outsourced
is
pni|x(j) ≡ P
(
pni(j) < p|pxni(j) ≤ plni(j)
)
=
1
pini(j)
∫ p
0
exp
(
−Sn
(
σn
σn − 1
w
z
)−θ)
dFpx(z)
=
1
pini(j)
∫ p
0
Ti
(
σn
σn − 1
)−θ
(pidni)
−θ θzθ−1 exp
(−Φnizθ) dz
=
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
pini(j)
1
Φni
∫ p
0
Φniθz
θ−1 exp
(−Φnizθ) dz
= 1− e−Φnipθ = P (pni(j) < p)
From this, it follows that the fraction of expenditure on outsourced type-i activities in
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total expenditure on type-i activities is also pini(j),∫ 1
0
pini(j)pni|x(j)qni(j)dj∫ 1
0
pni(j)qni(j)
= pini(j) = pini.
Let’s calculate the expenditure on outsourced type-i activities in total expenditure. From
(A.9), the expenditure share on type-i activities is
PniQni
pnyn
= γni.
Thus, the expenditure share on outsourced type-i activities is
Xni
pnyn
= γni
Ti (µnpidni)
−θ
Snw−θ + Ti (µnpidni)
−θ (A.10)
which is decreasing in dni.
B Extensions
B.1 A model with a delivery decision
Consider a model that differs from the one in Section 2 in the following way. After production
has taken place, the seller faces the decision of how much of the produced goods to deliver to
the buyer. Denote this quantity by d. Once delivered, the goods cannot be retrieved anymore.
The stipulated quantity q∗ in the contract is the quantity to be delivered. Both buyer and
the court have no way of verifying that any goods in excess of d have been produced. The
enforcement of the contract is as described in Section 2. Once the parties have settled, the
seller and the buyer may bargain over the surplus from the excess production, with the control
over the goods being with the seller (i.e. he can partially revert the production process in case
the bargaining breaks down). Again the settlement is as described in Section 2.
First, note that the seller will not deliver more than q∗ to the buyer: the contract and the
court will not reward him for producing/delivering more than q∗. Suppose now that the seller
delivers 0 ≤ d ≤ q∗ and holds back x ≡ q − d ≥ 0. Then his payoff is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(d)−R(q∗) +M(q∗)) + 1
2
(R(d+ x)−R(d) + ωcx)− c (d+ x) .
and his profit maximization problem consists of maximizing this expression subject to the
constraints d ≥ 0, d ≤ q∗, and x ≥ 0. Note that if δ < 1, the first constraint is never binding,
since limd→0R(d) =∞.
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The first-order conditions for this problem are(
1− 1
2
δ
)
R′(d) +
1
2
(R′(d+ x)−R′(d)) = c (B.1)
1
2
(R′(d+ x) + ωc) = c (B.2)
Let’s discuss all cases. For q∗ sufficiently high, we have that (B.1) holds. If
1
2
(R′(d) + ωc) > c
then the seller holds back some production ((B.2) holds), and we have
R′(d+ x) = (2− ω) c
R′(d) =
ωc
1− δ . (B.3)
R′(d) > (2− ω) c and R′(d) = ωc
1−δ implies that
ωc
1−δ > (2− ω) c and thus qω > qδ. Thus, this
case can only happen if the latter holds. On the other hand, if 1
2
(R′(d) + ωc) < c, then x = 0
and d satisfies
(
1− 1
2
δ
)
R′(d) = c thus d = qδ.
If (B.1) does not hold, then d = q∗. As above, if R′(d) > (2− ω) c then R′(d+x) = (2− ω) c,
otherwise x = 0, and d < qδ.
To summarize, it is impossible to implement a higher quantity than max(qδ, qω). It remains
to show that there is a contract that implements max(qδ, qω) and where the seller is pushed
down to his participation constraint.
• Case 1, 2 − ωi ≥ 1/(1 − 12δ), or, equivalently, qω ≤ qδ. In this case, choosing q∗ to be
greater than qδ and setting
M(q) = M(q∗) =
1
1− 1
2
δ
cqδ +R(q
∗)−R(q)
will implement d = qδ, since R
′(d) = 1/(1− 1
2
δ) and thus R′(d) < 2− ω means x = 0.
• Case 2, 2− ωi < 1/(1− 12δ), or, equivalently, qω > qδ. Total payoff to seller is(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(d)−R(q∗) +M(q∗)) + 1
2
(R(qω)−R(d) + ωc(qω − d))− cqω
Set M(q∗) = 0 and q∗ such that(
1− 1
2
δ
)
(R(d)−R(q∗)) + 1
2
(R(qω)−R(d) + ωc(qω − d) = cqω
where d satisfies equation (B.3). The q∗ is greater than d. Since 2− ωi < 1/(1− 12δ), we
have that R′(d) > (2− ω) c, thus q > d and R′(d+ x) = (2− ω) c.
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C Further robustness checks
C.1 Results when using Rauch classification
Table 11 shows the results from running specification (3.1) where the enforcement-intensity
variable is replaced by a measure of relationship-specificity that is constructed from the Rauch
(1999) classification of goods: ri measures the fraction of sector i’s products that are traded on
an organized exchange or where reference prices are listed in trade publications. The resulting
measure is hence similar to what Nunn (2007) uses to describe relationship-specificity.
The point estimates of the interaction term coefficient come out as marginally insignificant
at the 5% level. This may be due to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity across upstream
sectors and countries, a problem that can be avoided by using the bilateral enforcement-intensity
measure.
One potential concern may be that the results of section 3 are driven by individual sectors.
Indeed, Table 3 shows that the numerical values for enforcement-intensity are particularly
high for the top three sectors. Table 12 runs specification (3.1) without observations where
the upstream sector is one of the top three enforcement-intensive sectors, as measured by z
(2)
ni
(Insurance, Business Services, Financial Services). The estimates of the interaction term remain
statistically significant at the 5% level.
D Data Description
D.1 Construction of the enforcement-intensity measures
I start off with all cases in the ’Federal and State court cases’ repository from LexisLibrary
that are between January 1990 and December 2012 and include ’contract’ as one of their core
terms.41 I then exclude all cases that are filed in a court of appeals, or a higher court. If there
have been any counterclaims, I treat them as separate cases. This leaves me with 23261 cases
that span 34219 plaintiffs and 50599 defendants.
I match the plaintiffs and defendants to the universe of US firms that are contained in the
Orbis database of firms, based on the name strings.42 I use a Fellegi-Sunter matching algorithm
that compares the occurence of bigrams in each possible pairing. The first four characters are
weighted more heavily. If the score is above a threshold (0.92), I consider the match to be
successful. I then match the SIC classifications from Orbis to GTAP sectors, using a hand-
written concordance table, which is partly based on the definition of the GTAP sectors in terms
of CPC or ISIC codes43, and partly on the description of the sectors. Since I am only interested
in the industry of the plaintiff and defendant firms, if both firm names in a candidate pair
41I thank Jinesh Patel and the legal team at LexisNexis UK for permission to automatically retrieve and
process the LexisLibrary data.
42This includes many US subsidiaries of foreign firms. The total number of US firms in my version of Orbis
is 21,014,945.
43See https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases/contribute/concordinfo.asp
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contain the same trade name (’bank’,’architects’, etc.), I also regard the pair as matched even
if their matching score is below the threshold.
Table 13 summarizes the results of the matching process. I manage to associate 52.2 percent
of all parties to firms in Orbis. In order to see whether the fraction of matched entries is close
to the number of possible matches, one needs to know the fraction of businesses (or at least
non-individuals) among the plaintiffs and defendants. This information is not available in
LexisLibrary. However, I compare the matching rates with the fraction of business plaintiffs
and defendants in an auxiliary dataset, the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, which
covers (among other things) a sample of 6,802 contract cases in state courts.44 In that dataset,
53.9 percent of all parties are non-individuals, and 49.6 percent are businesses. Even though it
is likely that parties in federal courts are more likely to be businesses and organizations rather
than individuals, I view this comparison as supporting the view that I am able to match most
of the relevant parties.
44See US Department of Justice (1996) for a description. In calculating the figures in Table 13 I exclude cases
that pertain to mortgage foreclosure, rental agreements, fraud, and employment.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for country-wide input shares
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Intermediate Input Share 0.53 0.08 0.25 0.69 109
Domestic Intermediate Input Share 0.37 0.08 0.12 0.58 109
Note: ‘Intermediate input share’ refers to the sum of all intermediate inputs (materials) in gross output.
The domestic intermediate input share is defined analogously, but only includes domestically sourced
intermediate inputs.
Table 2: Summary statistics for enforcement-intensity measures
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N Correlation with Xni/Xn
z
(1)
ni 5.34·10−5 1.778 ·10−4 0 .00303 1225 0.17
z
(2)
ni 2.22·10−5 0.586 ·10−4 0 .00122 1225 0.29
Note: The table shows summary statistics for the relationship-specificity measures z
(1)
ni and z
(2)
ni , as
defined by equation (3.2). The correlation between the two variables is 0.48.
Table 3: Average enforcement-intensity of upstream sectors, z
(2)
ni measure
Upstream sector z
(2)
ni · 104 Upstream sector z(2)ni · 104
Insurance 1.099 Transport nec 0.163
Business services nec 0.785 Gas manufacture, distribution 0.118
Financial services nec 0.548 Transport equipment nec 0.116
Electricity 0.443 Food products and beverages 0.114
Trade 0.388 Recreation and other services 0.112
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 0.357 Mineral products nec 0.109
Paper products, publishing 0.354 Electronic equipment 0.108
PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 0.351 Oil and Gas 0.104
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 0.286 Wearing apparel 0.072
Metal products 0.233 Motor vehicles and parts 0.069
Communication 0.221 Water 0.044
Ferrous metals 0.22 Minerals nec 0.040
Metals nec 0.211 Petroleum, coal products 0.036
Machinery and equipment nec 0.199 Coal 0.035
Construction 0.198 Textiles 0.032
Air transport 0.194 Wood products 0.028
Manufactures nec 0.194 Leather products 0.019
Sea transport 0.176
Note: The table shows the enforcement-intensity z
(2)
ni of an upstream sector i, averaged across
downstream sectors. z
(2)
ni is defined as the number of court cases where a sector i firm sues
a sector n firm, divided by the geometric mean of the number of firms in sectors n and i.
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Table 4: Cross-country dispersion in two-digit intermediate input shares
I. Average standard deviations of intermediate input expenditure shares
σ
All sector pairs .023
Goods-producing upstream sectors only .020
Services-producing upstream sectors only .028
II. Frequency distribution of standard deviations of input expenditure shares, σni
Category # sector pairs % of total
All 1225 100
σni < .02 838 68.4
.02 < σni < .04 194 15.8
.04 < σni < .06 68 5.6
.06 < σni < .08 46 3.8
.08 < σni < .1 18 1.5
.1 < σni < .15 34 2.8
σni > .15 27 2.2
Note: The table presents statistics regarding the cross-country dispersion of intermediate input expen-
diture shares, at the two-digit sector-pair level. Part I shows means of the standard deviations, Part
II shows the frequency distribution of standard deviations. All intermediate input shares cover both
domestically and internationally sourced inputs.
Table 5: PPML estimates of m and θ
d
(1)
ni d
(2)
ni
log10m -3.55
∗∗ -3.62∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
θ 2.81∗∗ 3.06∗∗
(0.99) (1.17)
N 133525 133525
Pseudo-R2 0.79 0.79
Note: The table shows partial results from the estimation problem (4.7), using
z
(1)
ni and z
(2)
ni , respectively, to construct ω
(1)
ni and ω
(2)
ni . Robust anymptotic
standard errors are in parentheses. Pseudo-R2 is 1 − RSS/TSS. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Benchmark Results
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -71.78
∗∗∗ -101.0∗∗∗ -120.3∗∗∗
(15.39) (24.07) (28.53)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -9.246 -14.42
∗∗∗ -15.35∗∗∗
(4.829) (3.987) (4.176)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
R2 0.447 0.447 0.531 0.531 0.537 0.537
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the expenditure of sector n in country c on domestically and internationally sourced
intermediate inputs from sector i, divided by the total gross output of sector n in country c.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 7: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Robustness
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -90.24
∗∗∗ -72.24∗∗ -123.6∗∗∗
(25.01) (23.29) (30.24)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -7.871
∗ -12.65∗∗ -15.71∗∗∗
(3.796) (3.191) (4.635)
Trust interaction : trustc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) 29.99 4.808
(43.62) (54.78)
Trust interaction : trustc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) 0.692 -7.113
(5.996) (8.099)
High US expenditure share × enforcement cost: IUSni δc -0.0082 -0.011∗
(0.004) (0.0048)
High US expenditure share × trust: IUSni trustc -0.0007 -0.0006
(0.005) (0.005)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Up services Up services Full Full Full Full
N 53410 53410 106575 106575 106575 106575
R2 0.459 0.459 0.482 0.481 0.566 0.566
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the fraction of expenditure of sector n on intermediate inputs from sector i in country c in total gross output of sector n in
country c. Specifications (1) and (2) uses the subsample where the upstream sector is a services sector (defined as anything except agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing). Specifications (3) to (6) use the subsample of countries where the trust measure is available (i.e. all countries except Bahrain, Bolivia,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Cote d’Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos, Mauritius, Mongolia, Oman, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Tunisia, Qatar, and the UAE).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 8: The Determinants of Expenditure Shares on Intermediates: Domestic Inputs Only
Dependent variable: Expenditure share of sector n on domestic intermediate inputs from sector i, Xcni,dom/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/
√
#Firmsn#Firmsi) -45.14
∗∗ -63.46∗∗∗ -72.11∗∗∗
(13.37) (17.58) (21.68)
Contract enforcement interaction : δc(#Casesni/#Firmsn) -7.713 -10.75
∗∗∗ -10.80∗∗∗
(4.531) (2.882) (2.971)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525 133525
R2 0.315 0.315 0.453 0.453 0.465 0.464
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the fraction of expenditure of sector n on domestic inputs from sector i in country c in total gross output of sector n in country
c. The results are robust towards inclusion of trust and IUSn interactions as used in Table 7.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 9: Welfare and Productivity counterfactuals, by country
Using enforcement-intensity ω
(1)
ni Using ω
(2)
ni
To US levels To zero To US levels
δ ∆y, in % ∆P , in % ∆0y, in % ∆0P , in % ∆y, in % ∆P , in %
Albania 0.42 12.4 -7.2 25.7 -14.3 12.2 -6.7
Argentina 0.21 1.9 -1.2 11.8 -7.1 2.2 -1.3
Armenia 0.21 2.2 -2.2 12.9 -11.8 2.2 -2.0
Australia 0.24 4.2 -2.9 17.7 -11.3 4.7 -3.1
Austria 0.16 -0.4 0.3 9.8 -7.2 -0.5 0.4
Azerbaijan 0.21 2.2 -1.9 14.3 -11.2 2.7 -2.2
Bahrain 0.20 0.8 -0.6 6.0 -4.6 0.8 -0.6
Bangladesh 0.75 28.1 -16.8 43.2 -24.8 26.8 -15.4
Belarus 0.19 0.7 -0.6 7.1 -5.5 0.7 -0.6
Belgium 0.22 3.0 -2.6 16.4 -12.7 3.2 -2.7
Bolivia 0.38 11.5 -6.4 26.9 -14.2 12.2 -6.6
Botswana 0.36 5.2 -3.7 11.7 -8.7 5.6 -3.8
Brasil 0.23 2.1 -1.5 10.2 -7.2 2.4 -1.7
Bulgaria 0.28 6.0 -4.1 18.2 -11.8 6.2 -4.0
Cambodia 1.00 42.2 -22.2 66.0 -31.9 40.5 -21.5
Cameroon 0.53 14.1 -7.9 27.5 -14.7 13.9 -7.7
Canada 0.27 6.1 -4.0 20.8 -12.4 6.7 -4.2
Chile 0.33 10.9 -6.6 30.8 -16.2 12.6 -7.1
China PR 0.14 -1.0 0.8 8.3 -6.2 -1.2 0.8
Colombia 0.59 17.9 -9.8 32.3 -16.9 17.7 -9.2
Costa Rica 0.32 5.7 -4.9 14.9 -12.3 6.4 -5.3
Cote dIvoire 0.48 16.8 -10.4 31.4 -18.7 17.9 -10.9
Croatia 0.18 0.8 -0.6 13.6 -9.1 1.0 -0.6
Cyprus 0.22 2.6 -2.0 13.0 -9.1 2.7 -1.9
Czech Republic 0.39 15.2 -9.6 36.0 -19.5 15.5 -9.3
Denmark 0.28 6.1 -4.6 19.3 -13.2 6.5 -4.7
Ecuador 0.32 5.3 -3.5 13.8 -9.1 5.6 -3.6
Egypt 0.35 6.5 -4.1 16.0 -9.9 6.5 -3.8
El Salvador 0.26 3.3 -2.0 12.6 -7.7 3.8 -2.4
Estonia 0.18 0.7 -0.6 11.0 -8.6 0.8 -0.6
Ethiopia 0.21 0.9 -0.8 5.7 -5.2 0.9 -0.8
Finland 0.15 -0.7 0.6 8.0 -6.8 -0.8 0.7
France 0.20 1.6 -1.4 12.4 -9.5 1.8 -1.4
Georgia 0.44 15.2 -10.8 32.2 -20.1 16.0 -10.9
Germany 0.18 0.3 -0.3 9.2 -6.7 0.4 -0.3
Ghana 0.28 5.8 -4.2 17.6 -12.9 6.5 -4.6
Greece 0.21 1.7 -1.3 9.7 -7.1 1.7 -1.2
Guatemala 0.38 10.7 -6.3 24.1 -13.6 11.2 -6.4
Honduras 0.43 12.8 -8.0 27.1 -16.1 13.9 -8.1
Hong Kong 0.23 2.2 -2.0 9.5 -8.2 2.5 -2.1
Hungary 0.18 0.5 -0.4 12.7 -8.5 0.6 -0.4
India 0.51 18.4 -9.9 34.6 -17.7 18.4 -9.3
Indonesia 1.00 53.6 -20.8 94.4 -31.5 58.8 -21.3
Iran 0.21 1.4 -0.9 8.7 -5.5 1.6 -0.9
Ireland 0.31 8.5 -5.5 23.5 -14.2 9.4 -5.8
Israel 0.33 12.1 -8.4 32.4 -19.3 12.8 -8.5
Italy 0.41 17.4 -10.9 37.6 -20.8 17.4 -10.4
Japan 0.35 10.4 -7.2 25.1 -15.6 10.8 -7.3
Kazakhstan 0.25 3.7 -2.8 13.5 -9.8 3.8 -2.8
Kenya 0.38 7.9 -5.2 18.0 -11.6 7.6 -4.8
Kuwait 0.23 1.5 -1.2 6.6 -5.2 1.8 -1.3
Kyrgyzstan 0.31 8.2 -6.1 21.2 -14.3 7.2 -4.5
Laos 0.35 6.9 -7.6 15.5 -15.5 5.6 -5.7
Latvia 0.19 0.8 -0.6 9.6 -6.8 0.9 -0.6
Lithuania 0.25 2.8 -1.9 10.9 -7.3 3.3 -2.1
Luxembourg 0.11 -2.4 2.4 6.1 -5.7 -2.7 2.5
mean 0.33 7.5 -4.6 19.6 -11.9 7.8 -4.6
Continued on the next page
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Table 9: Welfare and Productivity counterfactuals, by country (ctd.)
Using enforcement-intensity ω
(1)
ni Using ω
(2)
ni
To US levels To zero To US levels
δ ∆y, in % ∆P , in % ∆0y, in % ∆0P , in % ∆y, in % ∆P , in %
Madagascar 0.50 18.8 -11.7 34.8 -21.0 18.0 -11.0
Malawi 1.00 31.9 -15.7 50.7 -23.4 36.4 -17.4
Malaysia 0.32 10.6 -6.9 28.6 -16.9 11.5 -7.0
Malta 0.40 9.3 -6.6 18.5 -12.9 8.9 -6.1
Mauritius 0.24 2.0 -1.6 8.2 -6.7 2.0 -1.5
Mexico 0.35 5.1 -3.5 12.0 -8.2 6.0 -4.0
Mongolia 0.33 5.7 -4.7 13.5 -10.6 6.2 -5.1
Morocco 0.29 5.5 -4.0 16.6 -11.1 5.6 -3.6
Mozambique 1.00 20.0 -10.2 31.4 -15.9 19.4 -9.3
Namibia 0.38 11.6 -7.3 26.4 -16.0 12.4 -7.4
Nepal 0.35 5.7 -4.3 12.3 -9.5 7.8 -7.5
Netherlands 0.29 6.2 -4.7 18.0 -12.8 6.5 -4.8
New Zealand 0.24 4.1 -2.9 18.0 -11.7 4.5 -3.1
Nicaragua 0.31 7.5 -4.4 21.0 -11.7 7.7 -4.4
Nigeria 0.38 4.4 -3.0 9.0 -6.2 4.1 -2.6
Norway 0.12 -2.4 1.8 8.6 -6.3 -2.8 2.1
Oman 0.18 0.4 -0.3 5.2 -3.9 0.4 -0.3
Pakistan 0.31 5.8 -3.5 15.9 -9.4 6.1 -3.5
Panama 0.56 22.3 -13.6 39.8 -22.3 22.3 -13.0
Paraguay 0.35 6.4 -4.4 15.2 -10.5 7.3 -4.6
Peru 0.40 10.4 -6.4 23.2 -13.5 10.1 -5.6
Philippines 0.32 7.4 -4.6 20.4 -11.8 8.0 -4.4
Poland 0.20 2.1 -1.6 16.6 -11.1 2.2 -1.6
Portugal 0.19 1.1 -0.9 12.2 -9.5 1.2 -1.0
Qatar 0.26 1.7 -1.2 6.0 -4.4 2.0 -1.3
Romania 0.24 3.6 -2.5 15.0 -9.7 3.8 -2.4
Russia 0.16 -0.6 0.4 11.5 -6.5 -0.8 0.4
Saudi Arabia 0.33 3.7 -2.5 9.2 -6.2 4.3 -2.9
Senegal 0.33 5.5 -3.5 13.8 -8.8 5.8 -3.6
Singapore 0.19 1.4 -0.9 17.9 -10.8 1.6 -1.0
Slovakia 0.30 8.2 -5.6 24.2 -14.7 8.9 -5.8
Slovenia 0.32 9.5 -6.4 26.7 -15.9 10.2 -6.5
South Africa 0.38 11.3 -7.4 25.6 -15.7 12.2 -7.8
South Korea 0.12 -2.8 2.1 10.2 -6.9 -3.0 2.2
Spain 0.21 2.2 -1.7 12.8 -9.2 2.5 -1.8
Sri Lanka 0.34 5.9 -3.7 14.6 -9.0 5.8 -3.4
Sweden 0.35 7.5 -6.0 17.0 -12.8 7.9 -6.2
Switzerland 0.25 3.8 -2.8 14.9 -10.4 4.1 -3.0
Taiwan 0.22 2.2 -1.5 12.5 -8.1 2.6 -1.7
Tanzania 0.18 0.4 -0.3 7.7 -6.3 0.5 -0.4
Thailand 0.18 0.6 -0.4 10.8 -6.7 0.7 -0.4
Tunisia 0.26 4.4 -3.1 15.3 -10.2 4.7 -3.1
Turkey 0.31 4.9 -3.0 13.6 -8.2 5.4 -3.1
Uganda 0.49 12.0 -6.6 23.5 -12.7 12.3 -6.5
Ukraine 0.44 32.7 -17.1 82.2 -31.7 34.2 -17.6
United Arab Emirates 0.31 3.5 -2.5 9.3 -6.7 3.8 -2.5
United Kingdom 0.25 3.5 -2.8 12.8 -9.4 3.9 -2.9
United States 0.17 0.0 0.0 9.1 -6.2 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 0.25 4.3 -2.6 17.9 -9.9 4.6 -2.9
Venezuela 0.48 18.5 -9.9 38.0 -18.6 18.8 -9.6
Vietnam 0.34 8.0 -5.3 19.3 -12.1 7.7 -4.6
Zambia 0.43 12.9 -7.2 28.2 -15.1 13.4 -7.0
Zimbabwe 0.35 7.5 -6.5 17.2 -14.0 6.5 -5.0
mean 0.33 7.5 -4.6 19.6 -11.9 7.8 -4.6
†‘Percentage due to physical inputs’ is the fraction of the change in real income (column 2) that is explained
through frictions associated with physical inputs, i.e. agricultural, mining, and manufacturing products.
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Table 10: Welfare and Productivity counterfactuals, averages
Using enforcement-intensity ω
(1)
ni Using ω
(2)
ni
To US levels To zero To US levels
δ ∆y, in % ∆P , in % ∆0y, in % ∆0P , in % ∆y, in % ∆P , in %
High income: OECD 0.24 4.59 -3.14 17.56 -11.46 4.88 -3.18
High income: non-OECD 0.24 2.35 -1.67 11.07 -7.48 2.53 -1.72
Upper middle income 0.31 6.51 -4.13 17.68 -11.03 6.79 -4.10
Lower middle income 0.39 11.42 -6.63 25.70 -14.10 11.96 -6.57
Low income 0.54 15.30 -8.86 27.64 -15.87 15.31 -8.68
Africa 0.42 9.78 -5.92 20.77 -12.60 10.10 -5.85
Northern Africa 0.30 5.46 -3.72 15.94 -10.38 5.60 -3.50
Eastern Africa 0.48 11.43 -6.58 22.55 -13.19 11.70 -6.38
Middle Africa 0.53 14.13 -7.90 27.45 -14.69 13.94 -7.74
Western Africa 0.37 8.12 -5.29 17.95 -11.63 8.56 -5.41
Southern Africa 0.37 9.33 -6.14 21.24 -13.48 10.08 -6.36
Americas 0.35 8.56 -5.21 21.13 -12.32 9.03 -5.27
Northern America 0.22 3.03 -2.00 14.98 -9.32 3.37 -2.12
Central America 0.37 9.63 -6.11 21.65 -13.14 10.17 -6.22
South America 0.35 8.93 -5.23 22.01 -12.34 9.37 -5.23
Asia 0.33 8.10 -4.87 19.90 -11.86 8.38 -4.82
Western Asia 0.27 4.24 -3.03 13.39 -9.21 4.57 -3.12
Central Asia 0.28 5.96 -4.45 17.36 -12.05 5.48 -3.67
Eastern Asia 0.23 2.78 -2.08 13.17 -9.27 3.01 -2.18
South-Eastern Asia 0.46 16.34 -8.58 34.11 -17.16 16.80 -8.25
Southern Asia 0.41 10.88 -6.51 21.57 -12.63 11.09 -6.67
Europe 0.25 4.90 -3.20 17.81 -11.16 5.10 -3.18
Northern Europe 0.23 2.99 -2.19 13.41 -9.49 3.23 -2.25
Western Europe 0.20 1.73 -1.30 12.38 -9.30 1.84 -1.34
Eastern Europe 0.27 7.60 -4.56 24.83 -13.22 7.92 -4.58
Southern Europe 0.29 6.79 -4.45 19.60 -12.34 6.89 -4.28
Oceania 0.24 4.15 -2.89 17.86 -11.53 4.59 -3.08
Note: Table shows the average counterfactual welfare changes when enforcement costs are set to US levels
(17%). Income groups are from the July 2013 World Bank income classifications; Regions are defined
according to the UN geographical classification.
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Table 11: Results when using Rauch classification of goods
Dependent variable: Intermediate Input Expenditure Share Xcni/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contract enforcement interaction : δcr
(con)
i -0.00862 -0.00862
(0.00446) (0.00453)
Contract enforcement interaction : δcr
(lib)
i -0.00674 -0.00674
(0.00422) (0.00428)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 122080 122080 122080 122080
R2 0.534 0.534 0.541 0.541
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Independent variable is an interaction of enforcement cost with the fraction of the upstream sector’s
goods that are traded on an organized exchange or reference-priced in trade publications (according to
Rauch’s (1999) liberal and conservative classifications).
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 12: Robustness: Without top 3 enforcement intensive input sectors
Dependent variable: Intermediate Input Expenditure Share Xcni/X
c
n
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contract enforcement interaction : δcz
(2)
ni -139.8** -178.0**
(44.22) (55.59)
Contract enforcement interaction : δcz
(1)
ni -24.20** -27.52**
(7.834) (8.246)
Upstream × Downstream fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Upstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Downstream × Country fixed effects Yes Yes
N 122080 122080 122080 122080
R2 0.534 0.534 0.541 0.541
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level
Note: Dependent variable is the expenditure of sector n in country c on domestically and inter-
nationally sourced intermediate inputs from sector i, divided by the total gross output of sector
n in country c. Sample is the same as in Table 7, except that Insurance, Business Services, and
Financial Services upstream sectors are not included.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: Matching Plaintiffs and Defendants to Orbis Firms: Statistics
Plaintiffs Defendants All
number in pct number in pct number in pct
Handmatched: 169 223 392
Population: 34388 100.0 50822 100.0 85210 100.0
perfect matches 1649 4.8 1666 3.3 3315 3.9
Matches: above threshold 13058 38.0 25838 50.8 38896 45.6
based on trade name 839 2.4 1419 2.8 2258 2.6
Total matches: 15546 45.2 28923 56.9 44469 52.2
Civil Justice Survey: non-individuals 53.9
businesses 49.6
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Figure 1: Timeline of the contracting game
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Figure 2: Enforcement costs and intermediate input shares are negatively correlated
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Note: Variable on the vertical axis is the total expenditure on intermediate inputs, across all sectors, divided
by gross output. Variable on the horizontal axis is log δc. Figure excludes OPEC countries and other countries
where oil rents exceed 20% of GDP in 2011, as reported by the World Bank WDI.
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Figure 3: Cross-country distribution of input shares by upstream sector
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Figure 4: First-order welfare effects depend on the parameter m
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Note: The counterfactual is to set enforcement costs to US levels. Vertical axis is the first-order approximation
to the consumer price level drop (in percent) as implied by equation (4.3), with using the observed input-output
shares Ξ. Lines refer to the percentiles of the distribution of price drops across countries.
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Figure 5: Counterfactual productivity and welfare gains
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